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with the names of the Defendants beginning at the left margin, and 
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CAROL PEARCE, an individual; 
Deceased - May 3, 1987. 
HOLLADAY BANK & TRUST, a Utah corporation; 
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Not represented by counsel. Default judgment entered, 
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DARRELL D. TANNER, individually, and as Trustee of the Tanner 
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TRACY A. TANNER McDONALD, an individual; 
LINLEY A. TANNER, an individual; 
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THE RICHARD GILL COMPANY, dba GILL COMPANIES, a Texas corporation; 
Represented by Robert F. Nelson, Sr., Vice President and 
General Counsel. Disclaimed any interest and dismissal 
entered. Record at 112, 117. 
BLUNDELL and WEBER, INC., dba UTAH ENGINEERING COMPANY, a Utah 
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Not represented by counsel. Default judgment entered. 
Record at 99. 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WASHINGTON NATIONAL INSURANCE : 
COMPANY, an Illinois : 
corporation, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent : 
v. : 
SHERWOOD ASSOCIATES, a Utah : 
limited partnership; : 
THE RIDGE ATHLETIC CLUB, INC.,; 
a Utah corporation; : 
DARRELL D. TANNER, : 
individually, and as Trustee : 
of the Tanner Family Trust; : 
JASON TANNER, an individual; : 
TRACY A. TANNER MCDONALD, an : 
individual; LINLEY A. TANNER, : 
an individual; BRADLEY H. : 
TANNER, an individual; et al.,: 
Defendants-Appellants. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION 
This is an action to judicially foreclose a trust deed. 
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was granted by 
Order signed and entered on May 11, 1989, which Order was expressly 
stated to be final and appealable. Record at 577. Defendants 
Darrell D. Tanner, Jason Tanner, Tracy A. Tanner McDonald, Linley 
A. Tanner, Bradley H. Tanner, Darrell D. Tanner as Trustee of the 
Tanner Family Trust, and the Ridge Athletic Club, Inc. (hereinafter 
"Tanner Defendants"), filed their Notice of Appeal on May 19, 1989. 
Record at 626. This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1989). 
Case No. 890502-CA 
Priority 14b 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether the 1985 amendment to Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31 
operated retrospectively as a remedial statute. 
2. Whether, even if the 1985 amendment to § 57-1-31 operated 
prospectively only, the tender of Ridge Athletic Club was 
inadequate as a matter of law. 
3. Whether personal property added by the Tanner Defendants 
was after-acquired property and thus subject to a security interest 
in favor of Plaintiff. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
A copy of Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31 prior to its 1985 amendment 
is reproduced in Appendix A and a copy of § 57-1-31 after its 
amendment in 1985 is reproduced in Appendix B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. 
Plaintiff filed this action to judicially foreclose a deed of 
trust. 
Course of Proceedings Below. 
Plaintiff filed its Complaint to judicially foreclose a deed 
of trust on real property located in Utah County on December 10, 
1987. Record at 1. The Tanner Defendants filed their Answer on 
January 5, 1988. Record at 81. 
On November 21, 1988, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment, along with a Memorandum in Support thereof, the Affidavit 
of James W. Craig, and the Affidavit of Clark W. Sessions. Record 
at 308, 311, 355, 359. The Tanner Defendants responded in 
opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on December 
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19, 1988, record at 376, and filed their own Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Record at 374. On December 20, 1988, the Tanner 
Defendants filed the Affidavit of Darrell Tanner, record at 382, 
and Plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike Affidavit of Darrell Tanner 
on the grounds that the statements contained therein did not set 
forth specific facts showing that the statements were true as 
required by Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). Record at 388. 
Plaintiff filed a Reply to Tanner's Memorandum in Opposition 
to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Response to Tanner's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, record at 391, and on March 10, 1989, 
filed a Notice to Submit for Decision and Request for Oral 
Argument. Record at 426. On March 22, 1989, the Tanner Defendants 
filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of Tanners' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, record at 484, and on March 29, 1989, Plaintiff filed a 
Motion to Strike the Tanner Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support 
of Tanners' Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support 
Thereof on the grounds that, among other things, the Tanner 
Defendants' Reply was untimely. Record at 491. 
Plaintiff subsequently amended its Motion for Summary Judgment 
to omit any claims against Defendant Holladay Bank & Trust. Record 
at 477. On March 31, 1989, the Court heard oral argument on 
Plaintiff's and the Tanner Defendants' Motions for Summary 
Judgment, and on April 7, 1989, the Court issued its Memorandum 
Decision granting Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
Record at 506. 
On May 11, 1989, the Court executed and entered its Order 
granting Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, record 
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at 577; the Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure, record at 582; and 
Order of Sale, record at 589. 
The Tanner Defendants filed a Notice of Appeal on May 19, 
1989- Record at 626. On May 22, 1989, the Court entered a 
Temporary Restraining Order, restraining the foreclosure sale of 
the subject property. Record at 629. On May 25, 1989, a hearing 
was held on the Tanner Defendants' Motion for Stay of Execution 
pending appeal and to set the amount of a supersedeas bond. The 
Court ordered that any foreclose sale would be stayed pending the 
appeal of this matter upon the Tanner Defendants' posting of the 
subject property as a supersedeas bond so long as Defendant Darrell 
Tanner complied with certain conditions with respect to the 
property. However, an Order was never prepared by the Tanner 
Defendants for submission to the Court for execution and entry, and 
an undertaking on the property was never filed with the Court. 
Statement of Facts. 
On or about December 24, 1979, Sherwood Associates, by its 
general partners David R. Stewart and Wayne E. Pearce, executed in 
favor of Bettilyon Mortgage Loan Co. ("Bettilyon"), a Trust Deed 
Note ("Note") in the principal sum of $1,200,000, payable, together 
with interest thereon, at the rate of 11 1/2% per annum until paid. 
Record at 313. A true and correct copy of the Note is reproduced 
in Appendix C. To secure payment of the Note, Sherwood Associates 
executed in favor of Bettilyon a Deed of Trust with Assignment of 
Rents ("Trust Deed") dated December 24, 1979, with respect to real 
property located in Utah County. Record at 313. A true and 
correct copy of the Trust Deed is reproduced in Appendix D. 
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In connection with the loan transactions evidenced by the Note 
and Trust Deed, Defendant Sherwood Associates executed a Security 
Agreement and a Financing Statement dated December 24, 1979, in 
favor of Bettilyon, which Security Agreement was duly filed with 
the office of the Lieutenant Governor/Secretary of State, State of 
Utah. The Financing Statement was recorded in the office of the 
Utah County Recorder. Record at 314-15. A copy of the Security 
Agreement is reproduced in Appendix E. 
On or about December 24, 1979, the Osmond Defendants (Osmond 
Brothers Investment Trust, George V. Osmond, Trustee, and Olive 
Davis Osmond, Trustee; George V. Osmond, Olive Davis Osmond, Allan 
R. Osmond, Suzanna P. Osmond, Merrill D. Osmond, Mary C. Osmond, 
M. Wayne Osmond, Kathlyn L. Osmond, Donald C. Osmond, Debra A. 
Osmond, Jay W. Osmond, Olive Marie Osmond) and David R. Stewart, 
Durinda A. Stewart, Wayne E. Pearce and Carol Pearce, executed in 
favor of Bettilyon a certain Guaranty under which they guaranteed 
payments of all sums due under the Note and Trust Deed and timely 
performance of all obligations of Sherwood Associates contained in 
the Note and Trust Deed and collateral loan documents. Record at 
315-16. A copy of the Guaranty is reproduced in Appendix F. 
On or about January 2, 1980, Bettilyon executed and delivered 
to Washington National Insurance Co., the Plaintiff herein, an 
Assignment of Trust Deed under which Bettilyon transferred and 
assigned the beneficial interest in the Trust Deed to Plaintiff. 
On or about January 3, 1980, Bettilyon executed and filed with the 
office of the Lieutenant Governor/Secretary of State, State of 
Utah, an Assignment of the Financing Statement, which assigned to 
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Plaintiff the rights of Bettilyon under the Security Agreement and 
Financing Statement. Bettilyon also executed the Note over to 
Plaintiff. On or about April 10, 1980, Bettilyon assigned its 
interest in the Guaranty to Plaintiff. Record at 313, 314, 316. 
On or about December 31, 1982, Defendant Darrell Tanner 
purchased the property described in the Trust Deed, record at 261, 
265, 296, and on January 10, 1983, executed an Addendum to Guaranty 
of the obligations evidenced by the Note, Trust Deed and all of the 
loan documents and other documents evidencing the indebtedness to 
Plaintiff or executed in connection therewith by Sherwood 
Associates and/or the other Guarantors. Record at 344. A true and 
correct copy of the Addendum to Guaranty is reproduced in Appendix 
G. 
The loan went in to default by reason of non-payment of 
installments due under the terms of the loan documents. The last 
payment received by Plaintiff was the April, 1987, payment received 
on or about May 1, 1987. Record at 317, 356. Plaintiff thereafter 
accelerated the Note according to its terms by letter dated 
November 30, 1987. Record at 317, 348. A copy of the November 30, 
1987, letter is reproduced in Appendix H hereto. By said letter, 
Plaintiff demanded payment in full by December 7, 1987, indicating 
that if payment in full were not made by that date, "action will 
be commenced to collect the total sum due and owing, to foreclose 
the Trust Deed, to appoint a Receiver over the subject property, 
and to otherwise protect the interest of Washington National 
Insurance Company as by law provided together with costs and 
attorneys' fees." Record at 348. 
2088-7L.PL2 6 
Ridge Athletic Club responded to the November 30
 f 1987, letter 
with a tender purporting to tender payment of the delinquency due 
under the Note. Record at 352. A copy of the tender is reproduced 
in Exhibit I. Plaintiff objected to the tender on the grounds that 
the entire unpaid balance was due and owing, not just the 
delinquent amounts, and that Plaintiff doubted the ability of the 
Defendants to pay the tender. Record at 353. A copy of the 
December 8, 1987, letter is reproduced in Appendix J. Contrary to 
Darrell Tanner's Affidavit statement, record at 382, that he had 
the ability on December 7, 1987, the date of the tender, to cause 
Ridge Athletic Club to pay the full amount tendered, neither Ridge 
Athletic Club, nor Darrell Tanner had sufficient cash on hand or 
in a bank account to pay the tender. Deposition of Darrell Tanner 
at 50-51. 
On December 10, 1987, Plaintiff filed its Complaint seeking 
judicial foreclosure of the Trust Deed. Record at 1. On Cross-
motions for Summary Judgment, the Trial Court granted Plaintiff's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, record at 577, and a final 
judgment for Plaintiff was entered on May 11, 1989. Record at 582. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Although statutes and amendments generally apply prospectively 
only, the United States Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme Court and 
courts of appeal of other states recognize that remedial or 
procedural statues apply retrospectively to contracts in existence 
and to pending or accrued causes of action. 
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The 1985 amendment to Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31 is remedial in 
nature and thus applies to the Trust Deed in this case. The 1985 
amendment does not impair the obligations of the parties' contract. 
In addition, the 1985 amendments merely ratified and made 
legal the express terms of the parties' contract. Accordingly, the 
amendment does not impair any terms of the contract of the parties. 
Remedial and procedural statutes operate retrospectively in 
the sense that the applicable date for their application is the 
date of judgment and not the date the contract was executed. Even 
if the 1985 amendment only applied prospectively, the tender of 
Ridge Athletic Club dated December 7, 1987, was inadequate as a 
matter of law since neither Ridge Athletic Club nor Darrell Tanner 
had the ability to actually pay the tendered amount on that day. 
Contrary to the Tanner Defendants' contentions, Plaintiff had 
clearly manifested its election to foreclose the Trust Deed in the 
manner provided by law for foreclosure of mortgages in its letter 
dated November 30, 1987, which warned that unless a sum certain was 
paid by December 7, 1987, Plaintiff would commence an action to 
foreclose the Trust Deed and have a receiver appointed over the 
property described in the Trust Deed. 
Finally, Plaintiff's security interest in the personal 
property was granted by Sherwood Associates to Bettilyon, its 
successors and assigns, and bound not only Sherwood Associates, but 
also its successors and assigns. The Security Agreement also 
covered after-acquired property and as such any personal property 
added by the Tanner Defendants is appropriately part of the 
property to be sold. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE 1985 AMENDMENT TO SECTION 57-1-31 IS REMEDIAL 
AND APPLIES TO TRUST DEEDS EXECUTED 
PRIOR TO ITS EFFECTIVE DATE 
In 1985, Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31 was amended effective April 
29, 1985. Prior to the 1985 amendment, § 57-1-31 provided in 
pertinent part as follows: 
Whenever all or a portion of the principal sum of 
any obligation secured by a trust deed has, prior to the 
maturity date fixed in such obligation, become due or 
been declared due by reason of a breach or default in the 
performance of any obligation secured by the trust deed, 
including a default in the payment of interest or of any 
installment of principal, or by reason of failure of the 
trustor to pay, in accordance with the terms of such 
trust deed, taxes, assessments, premiums for insurance 
or advances made by the beneficiary in accordance with 
the terms of such obligation or of such trust deed, the 
trustor or his successor in interest in the trust 
property or any part thereof or any other person having 
a subordinate lien or encumbrance of record thereon or 
any beneficiary under a subordinate trust deed, at any 
time within three months of the filing for record of 
notice of default under such trust deed, if the power of 
sale is to be exercised, or, otherwise at any time prior 
to the entry of the decree of foreclosure, may pay to the 
beneficiary or his successor in interest the entire 
amount then due under the terms of such trust deed and 
the obligation secured thereby (including costs and 
expenses actually incurred in enforcing the terms of such 
obligation, or trust deed, and the trustees' and 
attorney's fees actually incurred) other than such 
portion of the principal as would not then be due had no 
default occurred, and thereby cure the default 
theretofore existing and, thereupon all proceedings 
theretofore had or instituted shall be dismissed or 
discontinued and the obligation and trust deed shall be 
reinstated and shall be and remain in force and effect 
the same as if no such acceleration had occurred. 
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The 1985 amendment deleted the underlined phrase and made other 
minor changes in phraseology and punctuation.1 
A. Because the 1985 Amendment is Remedial, it Applies to Trust 
Deeds in Existence Prior to its Enactment. 
Both the United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution 
provide that no laws shall be passed impairing the obligations of 
contracts. U.S. Const, art. I, § 10, cl. 1; Utah Const, art. I, 
§ 18. Furthermore, Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-3 (1986) states: "No part 
of these revised statutes is retroactive unless expressly so 
declared." 
Nevertheless, newly enacted statutes or amendments may apply 
retrospectively without express legislative* intent if the statute 
or cimendment affects remedial or procedural rights. Home Building 
& Loan Ass'n. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 430 (1933); Oshkosh 
Waterworks Co. v. Oshkosh, 187 U.S. 437, 439 (1902); Tennessee v. 
Sneed, 96 U.S. 69, 74 (1877); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) 122, 200 (1819); Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 253 
(Utah 1988); Pilcher v. State, 663 P.2d 450f 455 (Utah 1983); Foil 
v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 151 (Utah 1979); Boucofski v. Jacobsen, 
36 Utah 165, 104 P. 117, 119-20 (1909). 
Significantly, the procedure elected by Plaintiff on the 
Defendants' default was that of judicial foreclosure pursuant to 
xUtah Code Ann. § 57-1-31 was also amended in 1981, subsequent 
to the execution of the Trust Deed. However, the Tanner Defendants 
make no claim that the pre-1981 version of § 57-1-31 applies in 
this case, and therefore, the pre-1981 version is not at issue. 
See South Carolina v. Gaillard, 101 U.S. 433 (1879) ("No question 
is raised in this case as to whether or not the act of 1877 
impaired the [earlier] obligation of the contract of the State, 
which is contained in the bills of the bank, or the charter. By 
accepting the act and bringing suit under it, Trenholm conceded its 
validity. ••) 
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Title 78, Chapter 37 of the Utah Code Annotated. At the time 
Defendants defaulted under the terms of the loan documents, the 
1985 amendments to Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31 had been effective for 
some two years. Nevertheless, the pre-1985 version of § 57-1-31 
appears to have allowed a trustor or his successor in interest to 
pay to the beneficiary the entire delinquency prior to the entry 
of the decree of foreclosure, thereby reinstating the trust deed 
if the beneficiary chose to judicially foreclose the trust deed. 
Whether the 1985 amendment, deleting the phrase "or, otherwise at 
any time prior to the entry of decree of foreclosure" altered a 
substantive right of the Tanner Defendants or merely altered the 
remedies available to the parties is at issue in this case. 
The early case of Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 
122 (1819), discussed the difference between an obligation of a 
contract and a remedy. The Court stated: 
The law binds [a contract party] to perform his 
undertaking, and this is, of course, the obligation of 
his contract. In the case at bar, the defendant has 
given his promissory note to pay the plaintiff a sum of 
money on or before a certain day. The contract binds him 
to pay that sum on that day; and this is its obligation. 
Any law which releases a part of this obligation, must, 
in the literal sense of the word, impair it. 
The distinction between the obligation of a contract, and 
the remedy given by the legislature to enforce that 
obligation, has been taken at the bar, and exists in the 
nature of things. Without impairing the obligation of 
the contract, the remedy may certainly be modified as the 
wisdom of the nation shall direct. 
Id. at 187, 200. 
In Tennessee v. Sneed, 96 U.S. 69 (1877), the taxpayer was 
assessed property taxes in 1872 in payment of which the taxpayer 
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tendered bills of the Bank of Tennessee which a tax collector 
refused. In 1874, the taxpayer sought mandamus to compel the tax 
collector to receive the Bank of Tennessee bills in payment of the 
taxes. However, in 1873, the Tennessee Legislature passed a law 
providing that if a tax collector institutes a proceeding for the 
collection of taxes and the party against whom the proceeding is 
taken considers the proceeding to be unjust or illegal/ the 
taxpayer shall pay the taxes under protest and within thirty days 
thereafter, sue the officer for recovery of the paid taxes. The 
1873 Act further provided that the foregoing procedure was 
exclusive. The taxpayer claimed that the 1873 Act placed such 
impediments in the enforcement of the Bank of Tennessee charter as 
to render the contract obligation valueless. The Supreme Court 
recognized the plethora of cases holding that "the Legislature may 
alter and modify the remedy to enforce a contract without impairing 
its obligation." Ici. at 73. 
If a particular form of proceeding is prohibited, 
and another is left or is provided which affords an 
effective and reasonable mode of enforcing the right, the 
obligation of the contract is not impciired. 
The rule seems to be that in modes of proceeding and 
of forms to enforce the contract the legislature has the 
control, and may enlarge, limit, or alter them, provided 
that it does not deny a remedy, or so embarrass it with 
conditions and restrictions as seriously to impair the 
value of the right. 
Id. at 74 (citations omitted) . The Court held the 1873 Act did not 
impair the obligations set forth in the Bank of Tennessee charter. 
Similarly, in Oshkosh Waterworks Co. v. Oshkosh, 187 U.S. 437 
(1902), the Supreme Court held that remedies or procedures may be 
changed without impairing the obligation of contracts. .Id. at 439. 
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In that case, the parties entered into contracts in 1883. In 1891, 
the city's charter was amended. The revised charter required those 
with an action against the city to present their claim or demand 
to the common council, with the right of appeal from the council 
on the posting of a cost bond. The waterworks company argued that 
the notice provisions impaired the obligation of its contracts with 
the city. The Court disagreed, stating: 
It is well-settled that while, in a general sense, 
laws in force at the time a contract is made enter into 
its obligation, parties have no vested right in the 
particular remedies or modes of procedure then existing. 
It is true the Legislature may not withdraw all remedies, 
and thus, in effect, destroy the contract; nor may it 
impose such new restrictions or conditions as would 
materially delay or embarrass the enforcement of rights 
under the contract according to the usual course of 
justice as established when the contract was made. 
Neither could be done without impairing the obligation 
of the contract. But it is equally well-settled that the 
Legislature may modify or change existing remedies or 
prescribe new modes of procedure, without impairing the 
obligation of contracts, provided a substantial or 
efficacious remedy remains or is given, by means of which 
a party can enforce his rights under the contract. 
Id. at 439 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
In response to the Great Depression of the 1930s, the 
Minnesota Legislature passed a mortgage moratorium law which 
extended the time provided to a mortgagor to redeem his property 
after foreclosure sale so long as certain conditions were met. The 
United States Supreme Court upheld the mortgage moratorium law. 
In so holding, the Court noted that earlier case law established 
that the constitutional prohibition against impairment of contract 
obligations "is not an absolute one and is not to be read with 
literal exactness like a mathematical formula." Home Building & 
Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 428 (1934). 
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The Court noted: 
" [T]o assign to contracts, universally, a literal 
purport, and to exact from them a rigid literal 
fulfillment, could not have been the intent of the 
constitution. It is repelled by a hundred examples. 
Societies exercise a positive control as well over the 
inception, construction and fulfillment of contracts, as 
over the form and measure of the remedy to enforce them. " 
Id. at 429 (quoting Qgden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 
(1827)). The Blaisdell Court further stated: 
Not only is the constitutional provision 
[prohibiting laws impairing the obligations of contracts] 
qualified by the measure of control which the State 
retains over remedial processes, but the State also 
continues to possess authority to safeguard the vital 
interests of its people. It does not matter that 
legislation appropriate to that end "has the result of 
modifying or abrogating contracts already in effect." 
. . . Not only are existing laws read into contracts in 
order to fix obligations as between the parties, but the 
reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power 
is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal 
order. The policy of protecting contracts against 
impairment presupposes the maintenance of a government 
by virtue of which contractual relations are worthwhile, 
— a government which retains adequate authority to secure 
the peace and good order of society. This principle of 
harmonizing the constitutional prohibition with the 
necessary residuum of state power has had progressive 
recognition in the decisions of this Court. 
290 U.S. at 435 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
The Utah Supreme Court has also recognized the difference 
between remedies and procedures and a party's substantive or vested 
rights, although not often in contract impairment cases. For 
example, in Boucofski v. Jacobsen, 36 Utah 165, 104 P. 117 (1909), 
the Court held that a post-judgment amendment authorizing a trial 
court to make additional findings of fact and conclusions of law 
applied to all pending actions. 
While it is true that a party's rights in a judgment, as 
a general rule, may not be affected by legislative acts 
passed or which become effective after the entry of 
judgment, the rule does not apply to laws which are 
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merely remedial, and which only affect matters of 
procedure or practice. 
104 P. at 119. 
Petty v. Clark, 113 Utah 205, 192 P.2d 589 (1948), indirectly 
involved the issue whether a later enacted amendment impaired the 
obligations of the contract of the parties. The amendment involved 
advisory juries in suits to foreclose mortgages and other liens. 
The Court stated: 
The 1945 amendment does not deal with the 
substantive right of the parties on which they relied in 
their dealings with one another out of which this action 
arose, but only deals with the method, or machinery of 
determining what the facts are. . . . That is by nature 
a procedural rather than a substantive right. . . . 
Substantive law is defined as the positive law which 
creates, defines and regulates the rights and duties of 
the parties and which may give rise to a cause of action, 
as distinguished from adjective law which pertains to 
and prescribes the practice and procedure or the legal 
machinery by which the substantive law is determined or 
made effective. 
192 P.2d at 593-94. 
Although the issues presented in this appeal appear to be of 
first impression, other states have passed laws regarding 
mortgages, trust deeds and their enforcement which have been held 
not to violate the constitutional prohibitions against impairment 
of contract obligations. In Columbian Building & Loan Co. v. 
Meddles, 34 Ohio L. Abs. 484, 35 N.E.2d 902 (1941), the mortgagors 
in 1927 executed a note and first mortgage, and later in that same 
year executed a second note and second mortgage. The holder of the 
first mortgage brought foreclosure proceedings in 1931, and in 
1933, the Court found that no part of the proceeds from the sale 
of the mortgaged property were applied to the judgment rendered in 
favor of the second mortgagee, and that she had a deficiency 
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remaining for which judgment was rendered against the mortgagors. 
In 1939, a conditional order of revivor was issued on the motion 
of the second mortgagee's administrator. However, the mortgagor 
moved for an order setting aside the conditional order for the 
reason that the judgment was void and could not be revived by 
reason of a statute passed in 1937 and amended in 1939 which 
provided that deficiency judgments shall be unenforceable as to any 
deficiency remaining due after the expiration of two years from the 
date of the confirmation of the sale or two years from the 
effective date of the statute, whichever was later. The Court held 
that the statute related to a remedy and that it did not therefore 
violate the federal or state constitution. The Court stated: 
The amendment to the effect that the judgment "shall 
be unenforceable as to any deficiency remaining due 
thereon, after the expiration of two years" brings the 
statute within the rules long recogni2:ed as to remedial 
rights. Parties to a contract have no vested interest 
in a particular limitation which has been fixed. They 
have no vested interest in time or the commencement of 
an action and as to the forms of action or modes of 
remedy. The Legislature may change these at its 
discretion, provided adequate means for enforcing the 
right remains. 
35 N.E. 2d at 904 (citations omitted). 
The 1937 law at issue in Columbian Building & Loan Co. was 
also at issue in Whalen v. Citizens Building & Loan Co. , 67 Ohio 
App. 139, 36 N.E.2d 54 (1940). In that case, the Court held that 
the law did not impair existing contract obligations and stated: 
It is well-settled in this state that no one has a 
vested right in an existing remedy, and a subsequently 
enacted section may curtail that remedy if a reasonable 
time is provided for assertion of the existing right. 
The fact that the law may, in such an instance, have a 
retroactive effect does not bring it within the 
inhibition of constitutional prohibition against 
enactment of retroactive laws. In each case, it becomes 
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a question of reasonableness of time within which the 
existing right may be asserted. 
36 N.E. 2d at 55. In Whalen, the mortgagee did not take any steps 
to enforce the deficiency judgment within the two-year period 
following the statute's enactment, but only caused two certificates 
of judgment to be issued during that time. The Court held that the 
issuance of the certificates of judgment were not sufficient to 
keep the judgment alive. 
Several Courts have held that statutes enacted subsequent to 
the execution of mortgages, which limit deficiency judgments to the 
amount by which the total indebtedness exceeds the fair market 
value or fair value of the property, is remedial in nature and 
therefore does not impair the constitutional prohibition against 
contract impairment. Guardian Depositors Corp. v. Powers, 296 Mich. 
553, 296 N.W. 675 (1941); Tompkins County Trust Co. v. Herrick, 171 
Misc. 929, 13 N.Y.S.2d 825 (Sup. Ct. 1939); Hollowav v. Barrett, 
87 Nev. 385, 487 P.2d 501 (1971); Alliance Trust Co. v. Hill, 196 
Okla. 31, 164 P.2d 984 (1946). 
In Guardian Depositors Corp., the defendant in a deficiency 
judgment action following foreclosure by advertisement was 
permitted to set off the difference between the price at which the 
property was sold and its fair value at the time of the sale. The 
Court noted that the Legislature "may modify and alter the manner 
and method of recovery as well as the time within which actions may 
be brought." 296 N.W. at 678. The Court quoted with approval the 
following propositions: 
"It is within the power of the legislature to change 
the formalities of legal procedure." 
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"Without impairing the obligation of the contract, 
the remedy may certainly be modified as the wisdom of the 
nation shall direct." 
"The rule seems to be that in modes of proceeding 
and of forms to enforce a contract, the legislature has 
the control, and may enlarge, limit, or alter them, 
provided that it does not deny a remedy, or so embarrass 
it with conditions and restrictions as seriously to 
impair the value of the right." 
"A statute is void as impairing the obligation of 
a contract if it takes away all remedy for the 
enforcement of the contract or if it leaves no 
substantial remedy therefor. Within these limitations, 
however, the Legislature may alter or abolish particular 
remedies, and may substitute one remedy for another." 
Id. at 679 (citations omitted). 
In Holloway v. Barrett, the Nevada Supreme Court, quoted 
Gelfert v. National City Bank, 313 U.S. 221 (1941), with approval: 
"The formula which a Legislature may adopt for 
determining the amount of the deficiency judgment is not 
fixed and invariable. That which exists at the date of 
the execution of the mortgage does not become so embedded 
in the contract between the parties that it cannot be 
constitutionally altered." 
487 P.2d at 505. 
The foregoing cases which upheld subsequently enacted statutes 
or amendments limiting the time for bringing or enforcing 
deficiency judgments and limiting the amount of deficiency 
judgments were held to be remedial statutes and not statutes which 
impaired the obligations of contracts. 
No less is the 1985 amendment to Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31 
remedial legislation. Although the 1985 amendment withdrew the 
trustor's ability to cure a deficiency if the beneficiary chose to 
judicially foreclose the trust deed, it must be remembered that the 
1985 amendment took effect two years prior to the time the 
Defendants went into default under the terms of the loan documents. 
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In addition, the foregoing cases reveal that the obligations of a 
contract are the act the contract requires the parties to perform 
or abstain from performing. The Note and Trust Deed in this case 
required the Defendants to make installment payments when due. The 
contract prohibited Plaintiff from accelerating the entire amount 
due under the loan documents unless the Defendants were in default 
under the terms of the loan documents. The law relating to 
judicial foreclosure of mortgages and trust deeds and to trustee's 
sales under the trust deed statutes are remedial in nature, 
pertaining to the parties' remedies in the event of default. 
Thus, because the 1985 amendment to Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31 
was remedial, it may be applied to trust deeds executed prior to 
its enactment. 
B. When an Amendment or Statute Enacted Subsequent to the 
Execution of a Contract Makes Legal What the Parties 
Contracted for. There is No Impairment of Contract 
Obligations. 
The Note executed by Sherwood Associates states that 
[i]f default occurs for Five (5) business days in the 
payment of said installments of principal and interest 
or any part thereof, the holder hereof, at its option and 
without notice or demand, may declare the entire 
principal balance and accrued interest due and payable, 
whereupon the whole thereof shall bear interest at the 
rate of eighteen per cent (18%) per annum, or highest 
rate permissible under the laws of the State of Utah. 
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereby 
severally waive presentment for payment, demand and 
notice of dishonor and nonpayment of this note, and 
consent to any and all extensions of time, renewals, 
waivers or modification that may be granted by the holder 
hereof with respect to the payment or other provisions 
of this note, and to release of any security, or any part 
thereof, with or without substitution. 
See Appendix C (emphasis added). 
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The Trust Deed provides in pertinent part as follows: 
14. Time is of the essence hereof. Upon default 
by Trustor in the payment of any indebtedness secured 
hereby or in the performance of any agreement hereunder, 
all sums secured hereby shall immediately become due and 
payable at the option of Beneficiary. In the event of 
such default, Beneficiary may execute or cause Trustee 
to execute a written notice of default and of election 
to cause said property to be sold to satisfy the 
obligations hereof, and Trustee shall file such notice 
for record in each county wherein said property or some 
part or parcel thereof is situated. Beneficiary also 
shall deposit with Trustee, the note and all documents 
evidencing expenditures secured thereby. 
27. Upon the occurrance [sic] of any default 
hereunder, Beneficiary shall have the option to declare 
all sums secured hereby immediately due and payable and 
foreclose this Trust Deed in the manner provided by law 
for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property and 
Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such 
proceesing [sic] all costs and expenses incident thereto 
including a reasonable attorney's fee in such amount as 
shall be fixed by the court. 
See Appendix D (emphasis added). 
Furthermore, the Guaranty provides: 
Guarantors do hereby jointly and severally guarantee to 
Lender (1) prompt payment, when due, of any sums of money 
owing by Borrower to Lender by reason of a certain Trust 
Deed Note dated December 24, 1979 . . . (2) the full and 
timely performance of the terms and provisions of any 
instrument securing the payment of said Trust Deed Note; 
and (3) prompt payment, when due, of any and all sums of 
money at any time owing by Borrower to Lender by reason 
of, in connection with, or arising out of the 
aforedescribed financing transaction. 
The undersigned Guarantors hereby waive notice of the 
advancement of funds to Borrower by Lender and further 
waive notice of default, notice of extension for payment 
or performance of Borrower's indebtedness or obligations, 
presentment, demand for payment, protest and notice of 
protest. 
See Appendix F (emphasis added). 
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The Addendum to Guaranty executed by Darrell Tanner provides: 
1. Tanner hereby jointly and severally guarantees 
to Washington National, its successors or assigns, and 
agrees to pay any and all sums owing to Washington 
National by Sherwood as evidenced by said Note, said 
Trust Deed and all of the Loan Documents and other 
documents evidencing the Indebtedness or executed in 
connection therewith by Sherwood and/or the Guarantors. 
2. Tanner adopts and agrees to be bound by the 
terms of the Guaranty . . . as though Tanner was a 
signatory thereto on the 24th day of December, 1979. 
See Appendix G. 
Thus, the loan documents themselves provided that upon 
default, Plaintiff had the option of immediately declaring all sums 
due and payable. 
In Fogg v. Southeast Bank, 473 So. 2d 1352 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1985), the Court held that an amendment enacted subsequent to 
the execution of a mortgage which exempted the mortgage from the 
operation of the original statute was a remedial statute which 
operated retrospectively. In that case, Fogg executed a promissory 
note and mortgage in 1981. The note, in the original amount of 
$2,250,000 provided for principal payments of $200,000 each on May 
1, 1982, and May 1, 1983, with quarterly payments of interest and 
the balance of principal together with accrued interest due on May 
1, 1984. The statute in effect when the mortgage was executed 
required a balloon mortgage legend to appear on the face of the 
mortgage. The mortgage did not contain the legend and was thus in 
violation of the original statute. The statute required a 
forfeiture of interest if the balloon mortgage did not contain the 
required legend on its face. In 1983, the balloon mortgage statute 
was amended to exempt from its operation mortgages securing 
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extensions of credit in excess of $500,000. The mortgagor argued 
that the amendment should not apply to his mortgage because it 
would impair his property rights and cause him to be in default on 
the interest payments of his mortgage, allowing foreclosure. The 
mortgagor had withheld interest payments stating that he relied on 
the law in effect at that time. In upholding the constitutionality 
of the amendment as applied to the mortgage at issue, the Court 
stated: 
Generally, statutes operate only prospectively as 
they might otherwise impinge upon vested rights or create 
new liabilities. On the other hand, statutes relating 
to remedies or procedure and including forfeitures 
operate retrospectively in the sense that all pending 
proceedings, including matters on appeal, are determined 
under the law in effect at the time of decision rather 
than that in effect when the cause of action arose or 
some earlier time. 
Id. at 1353 (emphasis added). 
The Court further stated that the amendment only exempted the 
mortgagor's mortgage from the penalty provision of the earlier 
statute. In response to the mortgagor's argument that the 
amendment placed him in default because of his failure to make 
interest payments, the Court stated: "Actually, appellant placed 
himself in default and exposed himself to foreclosure. It was his 
own fault that he was adversely affected by the amendment, as he 
had no right to withhold interest payments. Appellant in effect 
fashioned his own remedy for what he thought was an unlawful 
mortgage." Id. at 1355. The Court also stated: 
In McNair v. Knott, 302 U.S. 369, 58 S.Ct. 245, 82 
L.Ed. 307 (1937), the question was whether the National 
Bank Enabling Amendment of June 25, 1930, validated or 
made enforceable previous pledge agreements made to 
protect funds deposited before the amendment became 
effective. In that case, the receiver for a closed bank 
alleged that the pledge agreement was ultra vires and 
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illegal, and that it could not be validated by changing 
the law in force when the pledge agreement was made. The 
Supreme Court disagreed and said: 
There is nothing novel or extraordinary 
in the passage of laws by the Federal 
Government and the States ratifying, 
confirming, validating, or curing defective 
contracts. Such statutes, usually designated 
as "remedial," "curative," or "enabling," 
merely remove legal obstacles and permit 
parties to carry out their contracts according 
to their own desires and intentions. Such 
statutes have validated transactions that were 
previously illegal relating to mortgages, 
deeds, bonds, and other contracts. Placing the 
stamp of legality on a contract voluntarily and 
fairly entered into by parties for their mutual 
advantage takes nothing away from either of 
them. 
473 So. 2d at 1356 (quoting McNair v. Knott. 302 U.S. 369, 372-74 
(1937)) (emphasis added). The Fogg Court stated that "placing the 
stamp of legality on the mortgage, a contract which was created for 
the parties' mutual benefit took nothing away from either of them. 
The trial court therefore correctly applied the 1983 amendment 
. . . to this case." .Id. at 1356. 
Similarly, in Central Kentucky Production Credit Ass'n v. 
Smith, 633 S.W.2d 64 (Ky. 1982), the Kentucky Supreme Court held 
that a statute enacted subsequent to the execution of the parties' 
promissory notes and mortgage which act validated attorneys' fees 
agreement in notes and mortgages was not an unconstitutional 
impairment of the obligation of contracts. Prior to the 1980 
enactment, contractual provisions for the allowance of attorneys' 
fees were held unenforceable as against public policy. The notes 
provided for the payment of reasonable attorneys' fees, and the 
mortgage provided that all sums advanced by the mortgagee including 
"'all costs, expenses and attorneys' fees permitted by law'" would 
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become part of the indebtedness secured by the mortgage. Id. at 
65-66 (emphasis added). 
In upholding the constitutionality of the statute allowing 
attorneys' fees, the Central Kentucky Court stated: 
We are of the further opinion that [the statute] is 
remedial in nature and thus the controlling date for the 
application of the statute is the date of judgment and 
not the date of the execution of the instrument. 
No contract rights of the pcirties have been 
impaired. On the contrary a public policy bar to 
enforcement of the express terms of the writing has been 
removed. 
Id. at 66 (emphasis added). 
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Anzelmo, 222 La. 1019, 64 
So. 2d 417 (1953), involved a statute passed subsequent to the 
execution of a chattel mortgage which specifically allowed the 
right of executory process on movable property to creditors whose 
rights arose from acts under private signature, duly acknowledged. 
The right of executory process was not available to creditors at 
the time the chattel mortgage was executed. The chattel mortgage 
executed by the debtor stated that the mortgagor confessed judgment 
in favor of the vendor or subsequent holder for principal, 
interest, attorneys' fees and costs, and declared that if any 
installments were not paid at maturity, the vendor or future holder 
could seize the property covered by the mortgage and sell it under 
executory or other legal process. 
The Court held that the statute which allowed executory 
process was remedial: 
[The debtor's] obligations have not in anywise been 
rendered more burdensome; the defense which he could have 
asserted was nothing more than an opposition to the mode 
of procedure. Executory process is a remedy given by the 
Legislature to enforce obligations represented by a 
specified class of legal instruments. . . . It is the 
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settled law that remedial statutes and statutes governing 
procedure will be given retroactive effect in the absence 
of language showing a contrary intention. 
64 So. 2d at 420 (citations omitted). With respect to the 
provision in the mortgage whereby the debtor confessed judgment and 
agreed to allow executory process, the Court stated: 
This is the free and voluntary agreement of the obligor, 
signed without claim of duress. His argument loses all 
force in view of the fact that he confessed judgment in 
the manner prescribed by law, for the purpose of 
executory process; the fact that the procedural remedy 
he himself contracted for was in a form which at that 
time would not have authorized executory process does not 
detract from the validity of his confession of judgment. 
Id. 
The loan documents in this case provided that upon default, 
Plaintiff could immediately declare all amounts due and payable. 
The loan documents did not provide that if Plaintiff elected to 
accelerate and foreclose the Trust Deed in the manner provided by 
law for the foreclosure of mortgages, Defendants would nevertheless 
have the right to cure any deficiency up until the time the Decree 
of Foreclosure was entered. Although at the time the loan 
documents were executed, the Defendants apparently had that right, 
the 1985 amendment to Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31 merely validated 
what the parties contracted for. The Tanner Defendants cannot now 
be heard to complain that the 1985 amendment impaired their 
contract obligations. Their contract obligations remain unchanged 
by the amendment. 
C. The Controlling Date for the Application of Remedial or 
Procedural Statutes is the Date of Judgment and Not the Date 
of the Execution of the Instrument. 
Remedial or procedural statutes operate retrospectively in the 
sense that the applicable date for their application is the date 
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of judgment, and not the date of the execution of the instrument. 
Fogg v. Southeast Bank, 473 So. 2d 1352, 1353 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1985); Central Kentucky Production Credit Ass'n v. Smith, 633 
S.W.2d 64, 66 (Ky. 1982); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. 
Anzelmo, 222 La. 1019, 64 So. 2d 417, 420 (1953) . See also Docutel 
Olivetti Corp. v. Dick Brady Systems, Inc., 731 P.2d 475 (Utah 
1986) (in non-contract case, Court held that procedural statutes 
enacted subsequent to the commencement of a suit which do not 
enlarge, eliminate or destroy vested or contractual rights applied 
to accrued and pending actions as well as future actions); Pilcher 
v. State, 663 P.2d 450 (Utah 1983) (in non-contract case Court held 
that statutes facilitating recovery of existing child support debt 
which created no new obligations and destroyed no vested interests 
were remedial and procedural and therefore applied to accrued and 
pending actions); Petty v. Clark, 36 Utah 205, 192 P.2d 589 (1948) 
(in contract case, statute enacted subsequent to contract and 
commencement of suit with regard to advisory juries held remedial 
in nature and applicable to pending actions); Boucofski v. 
Jacobsen, 36 Utah 165, 104 P. 117 (1909) (in non-contract case, 
Court held that statute allowing court to enter additional findings 
and conclusions enacted after judgment entered, remedial in nature 
and therefore applicable to pending actions). 
Because the 1985 amendment to Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31 was 
remedial in nature, the post-1985 version of § 57-1-31 applies 
since that was the statute in effect at the time judgment was 
entered in this case. 
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POINT II 
AT THE TIME OF THE NOVEMBER 30f 1987, LETTER, 
PLAINTIFF HAD ELECTED TO FORECLOSE THE TRUST DEED JUDICIALLY 
The Tanner Defendants argue in Point III of their brief that 
even if the post-1985 version of Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31 applies 
in this case, they had the right to cure at all times prior to 
Plaintiff's first manifest election to proceed by judicial 
foreclosure which, they argue, was on the day Plaintiff filed its 
Complaint, December 10, 1987. Because Ridge Athletic Club had 
tendered the delinquency on December 7, 1987, the Tanner Defendants 
argue that they were not in default at the time Plaintiff filed its 
Complaint. The Tanner Defendants' argument is fatally flawed for 
several reasons. 
First, the Tanner Defendants argue that § 57-1-31 provides 
that a Trustor under a Trust Deed has a right to cure the default 
at any time within three months after the filing of a Notice of 
Default. "For contracts governed by the 1985 amendments, that 
right to cure can arguably be extinguished by electing to proceed 
by judicial foreclosure." Appellants' Brief at 14. However, the 
key provision of § 57-1-31 with respect to the Defendants' argument 
is that the Trustor can cure the default at any time within three 
months after the filing of a Notice of Default. There was no 
Notice of Default filed and recorded in this case. Thus, the 
Tanner Defendants cannot rely on § 57-1-31 for the proposition that 
they can cure a default at any time prior to the Beneficiary's 
election to proceed by judicial foreclosure. Obviously, if the 
Trustor were not in default under the terms of the loan documents, 
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a Beneficiary could not proceed with filing a Notice of Default or 
judicially foreclosing a Trust Deed. 
Second, the Tanner Defendants argue that the November 30, 
1987, letter does not contain a clear election to proceed by 
judicial foreclosure. However, the pertinent provisions of the 
November 30, 1987, letter, reproduced in Appendix H provide as 
follows: 
This is to therefore advise that pursuant to Paragraph 
27. of the Trust Deed and Paragraph 2. of the Trust Deed 
Note, Washington National Insurance Company hereby 
declares all sums secured by the Trust Deed immediately 
due and payable. Unless the total sum of $1,103,528.73, 
together with interest at the per diemi rate of $327.37 
from November 1, 1987, is received in the office of the 
undersigned on or before Monday, December 7, 1987, at 
5:00 p.m., action will be commenced to collect the total 
sum due and owing, to foreclose the Trust Deed, to 
appoint a Receiver over the subject property and to 
otherwise protect the interest of Wcishington National 
Insurance Company as by law provided together with costs 
and attorneys' fees. 
Appendix H (emphasis added). The phrase "foreclose the Trust Deed" 
and the phrase "appoint a Receiver over the subject property" 
permits no interpretation other than Plaintiff had elected to 
judicially foreclose the Trust Deed. Nowhere in the Trust Deed 
statutes, Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-1-19 through -36 (1986 and Supp. 
1989), does the word "foreclose" or its derivations appear other 
than in § 57-1-23 which states that "at the option of the 
beneficiary a trust deed may be foreclosed in the manner provided 
by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property." 
Foreclose is a term of art. When the power of sale conferred on 
a Trustee by § 57-1-23 is exercised, the Trust Deed is not 
"foreclosed;" rather, the Trustee's Deed operates to convey to the 
purchaser without a right of redemption in the Trustor, the 
2088-7L.PL2 28 
Trustee's title and all the Trustor's right, title, interest, and 
claim in the property sold. Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-28(2) (1986). 
Moreover, receivers cannot be appointed in non-judicial 
proceedings such as proceedings for Trustees' Sales. Utah Rule of 
Civil Procedure 66 states: "A receiver may be appointed by the 
court in which an action is pending or has passed to judgment:". 
Thus, an action or lawsuit must be instituted before a receiver can 
be appointed. The Trust Deed statutes do not provide for the 
appointment of a receiver. 
Third, the loan documents provide the Plaintiff could declare 
the entire principal balance and accrued interest due and payable 
without notice or demand. See second paragraph of Note, Appendix 
C. In addition, the Guarantors expressly waived notice of dishonor 
and nonpayment of the Note. See fourth paragraph of Note, Appendix 
C; fifth paragraph of the Guaranty, Appendix F; and paragraph 
numbered 2 of the Addendum to Guaranty, Appendix G. 
Thus, at the time Ridge Athletic Club tendered the 
delinquency, Plaintiff had already accelerated the entire principal 
balance and accrued interest and the Tender was consequently 
untimely and inadequate. See Romero v. Schmidt, 15 Utah 2d 300, 
392 P. 2d 37 (1964) (in judicial foreclosure of real estate 
contract, tender of delinquency must be made before balance 
accelerated). 
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POINT III 
EVEN IF THE 1985 AMENDMENT TO SECTION 57-1-31 
DOES NOT OPERATE RETROACTIVELY, 
RIDGE ATHLETIC CLUB'S TENDER WAS INADEQUATE AS A MATTER OF LAW 
Even if the Tanner Defendants are correct in their assertion 
that the pre-1985 version of Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31 applies in 
this case, Ridge Athletic Club's December 7, 1987, tender of the 
delinquency due and owing was inadequate as a matter of law. Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-27-1 (1987) provides that H[.a]n offer in writing to 
pay a particular sum of money or to deliver a written instrument 
or specific personal property is, if not accepted, equivalent to 
the actual production and tender of th€> money, instrument or 
property." Section 78-27-3 (1987) provides that 
[t]he person to whom a tender is made must, at the time, 
specify any objection he may have to the money, 
instrument or property, or he is deemed to have waived 
it; and, if the objection is to the amount of money, the 
terms of the instrument or the amount or kind of 
property, he must specify the amounts, terms or kind 
which he requires, or be precluded from objection 
afterwards. 
On receipt of Ridge Athletic Club's tender, counsel for 
Plaintiff immediately responded by letter dated December 8, 1987. 
See Appendix J. The December 8, 1987, Letter specifically set 
forth Plaintiff's objections to Ridge Athletic Club's tender, 
stating that the amount tendered was insufficient and that 
Plaintiff doubted Ridge Athletic Club's ability to make the tender 
good based on earlier promises of Darrell Tanner to cure the 
deficiency. Thus, uftder § 78-27-3, Plaintiff did not waive any 
objections it had to Ridge Athletic Club's tender. 
Hvams v. Bamberger, 10 Utah 3, 36 P. 202 (Utah 1894), set 
forth the requirement that in order for a Tender to be "equivalent 
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to the actual production and tender of the money," the party 
tendering must have the ability to produce it, and must act in good 
faith. 36 P. at 203. 
Ridge Athletic Club did not have the ability to produce the 
amount tendered on the date of the tender. In support of the 
Tanner Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, and in opposition 
to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Tanner Defendants' 
submitted the Affidavit of Darrell Tanner which stated in pertinent 
part, "On December 7, 1987, I had the ability to cause Ridge 
Athletic Club, Inc., to pay the sum of $119,200 as indicated in the 
tender. . . . The tender was made in good faith." Record at 382. 
The foregoing statements were made without any factual basis set 
forth in the Affidavit, and Plaintiff accordingly filed a Motion 
to Strike Affidavit of Darrell Tanner, asserting that Rule 56(e) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that affidavits 
submitted by the adverse party must set forth specific facts 
showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Record at 388. 
Plaintiff thereafter took the Deposition of Darrell D. Tanner and 
queried whether the $119,200 was available to him when the tender 
was made. Defendant Tanner answered in the affirmative. 
Deposition of Darrell D. Tanner at 44. In response to the question 
concerning the source of the funds available to Defendant Tanner 
to meet the tender amount, Tanner stated that a loan was closing 
with Citicorp for considerably more than the $119,200. Id. 
However, Defendant Tanner testified that the first advance on the 
loan was not made until December 31, 1987. Id. at 46. In response 
to further questioning concerning his ability to make good the 
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$119,200 tender on December 7, 1987, Defendant Tanner testified as 
follows: 
Q. All right. When I asked you what the source 
of the funds were available to make the $119,200 tender, 
you indicated there were several sources and that this 
[the Citicorp loan] was one. 
A. We had various company bank accounts that had 
funds in them also. 
Q. $119,200? 
A. Well, we may not have had that much in the 
bank, but we could have gone and got an advance from our 
banks against the Citicorp closing. You know, there's 
a number of ways to do it. 
Q. Did you have $119,200 available to you on 
December 7, 1987? 
A. Yes, we could have — you know, if Washington 
National had accepted the tender, we'd have simply gone 
down to the bank — with a combination of our bank 
accounts and the Citicorp deal, we could have just gone 
down, taken an advance on that from our bank, you know, 
in one day. 
. . . 
Q. Besides advances that you believe you could 
have received from your local banks, did you have any 
other sources available to you — 
A. Yes. 
Q. — that had $119,200? 
A. Yes. If I needed to, I didn't need to, but if 
I needed to I could have called my brother and got it in 
a day. 
Q. Let me ask you this question: Did you have 
$119,200 cash in hand on December 7, 1987? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Explain. 
A. Well, I just did. 
Q, Well, I understood that you could have — 
A. I have credit lines at the bank. I could go 
draw against the credit line, one. I could call my 
brother and take an advance from him if I didn't have any 
other way to do it. 
Q. In your personal account or in the Ridge 
Athletic Club —> 
A. Or a combination, or I could have taken it out 
of bank accounts, the combination. 
Q. In your bank accounts or in any Ridge Athletic 
Club bank accounts, was there $119,200 in the accounts 
on December 7, 1987? 
A. Well, I think you need to ask that again 
because that doesn't quite give me, the whole picture. 
Would you repeat that question? 
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Q. Did you have $119,200 in any of your personal 
bank accounts on December 7 — 
A. I don't even have a personal bank account• 
• • • 
Q. What about Ridge Athletic Club? Did the 
corporation have 119 — 
A. The corporation did not have $119,000 in their 
bank account. 
Q. On December 7 — 
A. No. 
Q. -- 1987? 
A. We don't carry that kind of money in that bank 
account, never have and never will, regardless of what 
it's making. 
Deposition of Darrell Tanner at 48-51. 
The Amended Notice of Taking Deposition (of Darrell Tanner) 
filed January 10, 1989, record at 402, requested that Darrell 
Tanner bring with him to his deposition "any and all documents, 
writing, notes, and memoranda, letters, or any other writing or 
document tending to support the allegations contained within the 
Affidavit of Darrell Tanner dated December 19, 1988. . . . " In 
response to the document request in the Amended Notice of 
Deposition, Darrell Tanner produced documents relating to the 
Citicorp loan. Deposition of Darrell Tanner at 56. All of the 
documents produced by Mr. Tanner, some of which were attached as 
Exhibits 6-10 to his Deposition, revealed that the first date 
Tanner or related persons or entities received any advances on the 
Citicorp loan was December 31, 1987, some three and one-half weeks 
subsequent to the date of the tender. See Exhibits 6-10 to 
Deposition of Darrell Tanner; Deposition of Darrell Tanner at 56-
63. 
Thus, despite Darrell Tanner's unsupported Affidavit 
allegations that he had the ability to cause the Ridge Athletic 
Club to pay the tendered amount on December 7, 1987, record at 382, 
2088-7L.PL2 33 
Mr. Tanner's own testimony reveals that neither he nor the Ridge 
Athletic Club had $119,200 on hand on December 7, 1987. 
Consequently, even if the Tanner Defendants had the right to cure 
only the delinquency amount on December 7, 1987, Ridge Athletic 
Club's tender of $119,200 was inadequate as a matter of law. 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF HAS A SECURITY INTEREST IN ANY PERSONAL 
PROPERTY ADDED BY THE TANNER DEFENDANTS WHICH 
WAS PROPERLY FORECLOSED AND INCLUDED IN 
THE ORDER OF SALE. 
Plaintiff is entitled to foreclose on all personal property 
which was placed on the real property by the Tanner Defendants and 
which falls within the definition of "personal property" as set 
forth in the Order of Sale. The Order of Sale provides: 
It is further ordered that the equipment, furniture, 
fixtures, furnishings and other property described in 
said Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure and more 
particularly described as follows be sold at public 
auction: 
All machinery, equipment, material, appliances 
and fixtures installed or placed by Debtor in 
the premises for the generation and 
distribution of air, water, heat, electricity, 
light, fuel or refrigeration, or for 
ventilating or air-conditioning purposes, or 
for sanitary or drainage purposes, or for the 
exclusion of vermin or insects, or for the 
removal of dust, refuse or garbage, and 
including all awnings, window-shades, draper 
[sic] rods and brackets, screens, floor 
coverings, incinerators, carpeting and all 
furniture and fixtures used in the operation 
of the buildings, together with all additions 
to, substitutions for, changes, in or 
replacements of the whole or any part of any 
or all of said articles of property. 
Record at 589 (emphasis added). 
The term "debtor" has the following common sense meaning which 
need not be defined in the Order of Sale: "One who owes a debt; 
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he who may be compelled to pay a claim or demand; anyone liable on 
a claim, whether due or to become due." Black's Law Dictionary 364 
(5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added). The Tanner Defendants were 
specifically found to be jointly and severally liable along with 
the other Defendants on the claims of Plaintiff in the Judgment and 
Decree of Foreclosure referenced in the Order of Sale, and thus 
fall within the common definition of "debtor." Record at 582. The 
Order of Sale therefore unambiguously directs the sale of personal 
property installed or placed by the Tanner Defendants on the real 
property for any of the enumerated purposes. 
As such, the Order of Sale grants Plaintiff relief to which 
it is specifically entitled under applicable case law and the Utah 
Uniform Commercial Code. The definition of "personal property" set 
forth in the Order of Sale tracts nearly verbatim the wording of 
the Security Agreement under which Defendant Sherwood Associates 
pledged as additional security for the repayment of the 
indebtedness evidenced by the Note all "present and future" 
machinery, equipment, material, appliances and fixtures "now or 
hereafter" installed or placed by Sherwood Associates in the 
subject property (including all proceeds thereof). Appendix E. 
Defendant Sherwood Associates then transferred its rights in 
Plaintiff's collateral to the Tanner Defendants pursuant to the 
Sale Agreement between Sherwood Associates, Darrell D. Tanner, and 
the Osmond Brothers Partnership, record at 265, and the Addendum 
to Guaranty executed by Darrell D. Tanner, Appendix G. Such 
transfer is permitted by Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-311 (1980) which 
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provides: "[t]he debtor's rights in collateral may be voluntarily 
or involuntarily transferred. . . . " 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-306(2) (1980) provides: 
[A] security interest continues in collateral 
notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition 
thereof unless the disposition was authorized by the 
secured party in the Security Agreement or otherwise, and 
also continues in any identifiable proceeds including 
collections received by the debtor. 
Where the security agreement covers after-acquired property, the 
security interest also continues in or attaches to the after-
acquired property of the transferee of the collateral. Inter 
Mountain Ass'n of Credit Men v. Villager, Inc., 527 P.2d 664, 670-
71 (Utah 1974); Smiley v. Wheeler, 602 P.2d 209, 211-12 (Okla. 
1979); American Heritage Bank & Trust Co.. v. 0. & E., Inc., 40 
Colo. App. 306, 576 P.2d 566, 568 (1978). 
In Villager, Inc., the Court relied not only on the provisions 
of Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-306(2) (1980), but also the fact that the 
security agreement expressly provided that the parties therein 
should include the successors or assigns of the parties in 
concluding that the after-acquired property of the transferee or 
assignee was subject to the security interest. 527 P.2d at 670-
71. The Security Agreement in this case contains a similar 
provision. It states: "This Agreement binds each Debtor, their 
respective heirs, personal representatives, successors, and 
assigns, and inures to the benefit of Secured Party, its successors 
and assigns." Appendix E. 
Further, the Security Agreement expressly prohibits the 
disposition of the collateral without the written consent of the 
secured party, Plaintiff. Appendix E. In general, there must 
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either be actual prior or subsequent consent in writing by the 
secured creditor manifesting a purpose to authorize the disposition 
free of the security interest, in order for a court to find an 
authorization permitting disposition free of the security interest 
within the meaning of § 9-306(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
Central California Equipment v. Polk Tractor, 78 Cale App. 3d 855, 
144 Cal. Rptr. 367, 371 (1978). Mere acquiescence is insufficient. 
Id. While the "or otherwise" language of § 9-306(2) permits an 
implied agreement, such an agreement should be found with extreme 
hesitancy and should generally be limited to the situation of a 
prior course of dealing with the debtor permitting disposition. 
Id. See also Matter of Matto's, Inc., 8 Bankr. 485 (Bankr. E.D. 
Mich. 1981) (the term "otherwise" is not satisfied by any form of 
consent which does not clearly and unambiguously authorize 
disposition of the collateral free of the security interest). 
The Addendum to Guaranty, Appendix G, specifically provides 
that the transfer of the collateral to the Tanner Defendants•is 
subject to the following reservations of rights by Plaintiff: 
[T]he Guarantors and Sherwood are in no way released, 
discharged or excused from performance under any of the 
Loan Documents including their respective obligations in 
connection with the payment of the indebtedness. 
"Loan documents" is defined as the Trust Deed Note, the Trust 
Deed with Assignment of Rents, and other documents executed by 
Sherwood and/or the Guarantors in connection with the loan. 
Furthermore, Tanner guaranteed and agreed to pay any and all sums 
owing to Plaintiff "as evidenced by . . . all of the Loan Documents 
and other documents evidencing the Indebtedness or executed in 
connection therewith by Sherwood and/or the Guarantors." Appendix 
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6. The Security Agreement executed by Defendant Sherwood 
Associates in connection with the loan is one of the loan 
documents. Not only did Plaintiff not manifest a purpose to 
authorize the transfer of the collateral free of the security 
interest, but the parties agreed that the transfer would be made 
subject to the security interest. Under such circumstances, the 
transfer of the collateral is made subject to the security interest 
of the creditor. See Matter of Franchise Systems, Inc., 46 Bankr. 
158 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1985), In re Southern Properties, Inc., 44 
Bankr. 838 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984). 
With respect to the Tanner Defendants' remaining contention 
that Plaintiff did not pray for the sale of any personal property 
added by the Tanner Defendants, the law in Utah is clear that 
every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the 
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if 
the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(c)(1). 
Plaintiff specifically asserted in its Complaint that 
"Plaintiff is entitled to foreclose its [security] interest as 
provided by law and to apply the proceeds of the sale to the 
indebtedness evidenced by the Note." Record at 1. As previously 
discussed, its security interest continued in the collateral sold 
to the Tanner Defendants and the personal property added to the 
real property by the Tanner Defendants. Plaintiff's assertion that 
it was entitled to foreclose on the security interest includes 
foreclosure on the additions made by the Tanner Defendants. The 
Order of Sale properly granted Plaintiff relief in the form of the 
directed sale of the personal property added to the real property 
2088-7L.PL2 38 
by the Tanner Defendants, despite any alleged failure to include 
such claim for relief in the prayer for relief. Record at 589. 
The Order of Sale provides for the sale of any personal 
property placed on the premises by the "Debtor" and requires no 
clarification inasmuch as the Tanner Defendants are debtors 
pursuant to the Security Agreement. In the alternative, if the 
case should require remand to clarify the Order of Sale, the Court 
should direct that the Order of Sale provide that Plaintiff is 
entitled to foreclose on the personal property placed on the 
premises by the original debtor, Sherwood Associates, and its 
successors and assigns which include Darrell Tanner and the other 
Tanner Defendants. 
CONCLUSION 
The 1985 amendment to Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31 was remedial 
in nature and thus applied retroactively to the Trust Deed and 
related loan documents executed in favor of Plaintiff. 
Accordingly, since Plaintiff had accelerated the entire principal 
balance, accrued interest and other charges on November 30, 1987, 
and had clearly elected, by its November, 30, 1987 letter to 
judicially foreclose the Trust Deed, Ridge Athletic Club's tender 
of the delinquency was untimely and inadequate. The 1985 amendment 
withdrew any right the Defendants may have had to cure a 
delinquency prior to the entry of a decree of foreclosure. 
In addition, even if the 1985 amendment to § 57-1-31 operated 
prospectively, Ridge Athletic Club's tender was inadequate as a 
matter of law since neither Ridge Athletic Club nor Darrell Tanner 
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had the ability on the date of the tender to pay the tendered 
amount. 
Plaintiff has a security interest in any personal property 
added by the Tanner Defendants under terms of the Security 
Agreement, Sale Agreement between Darrell Tanner, Sherwood 
Associates and Osmond Brothers Partnership, and the Addendum to 
Guaranty executed by Darrell Tanner. Consequently, Plaintiff's 
security interest in such personal property added to the real 
property by the Tanner Defendants was properly foreclosed and 
included in the Order of Sale. 
Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court affirm the 
Order granting Summary Judgment, the Judgment and Decree of 
Foreclosure and the Order of Sale in all respects. 
DATED this $0 day of November, 1989. 
SESSIONS & MOORE 
/ 
CLARK W. SESSK 
CYNTHIA K. CASSELL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Washington 
National Insurance Company 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE, 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 0.0^ day of November, 1989, I 
mailed four true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
RESPONDENT, first-class, postage prepaid, to: 
Jackson Howard, Esq. 
Leslie W. Slaugh, Esq. 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Appellants 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
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APPENDIX A 
PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE PRE-1985 
VERSION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-31 
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Utah Code Ann, § 57-1-31 in pertinent part prior to 
1985 amendment: 
Whenever all or a portion of the principal sum of 
any obligation secured by a trust deed has, prior to the 
maturity date fixed in such obligation, become due or 
been declared due by reason of a breach or default in the 
performance of any obligation secured by the trust deed, 
including a default in the payment of interest or of any 
installment of principal, or by reason of failure of the 
trustor to pay, in accordance with the terms of such 
trust deed, taxes, assessments, premiums for insurance 
or advances made by the beneficiary in accordance with 
the terms of such obligation or of such trust deed, the 
trustor or his successor in interest in the trust 
property or any part thereof or any other person having 
a subordinate lien or encumbrance of record thereon or 
any beneficiary under a subordinate trust deed, at any 
time within three months of the filing for record of 
notice of default under such trust deed, if the power of 
sale is to be exercised, or, otherwise at any time prior 
to the entry of the decree of foreclosure, may pay to the 
beneficiary or his successor in interest the entire 
amount then due under the terms of such trust deed and 
the obligation secured thereby (including costs and 
expenses actually incurred in enforcing the terms of such 
obligation, or trust deed, and the trustees' and 
attorney's fees actually incurred) other than such 
portion of the principal as would not then be due had no 
default occurred, and thereby cure the default 
theretofore existing and, thereupon all proceedings 
theretofore had or instituted shall be dismissed or 
discontinued and the obligation and trust deed shall be 
reinstated and shall be and remain in force and effect 
the same as if no such acceleration had occurred. 
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APPENDIX B 
PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE ANN § 57-1-31 
WITH 1985 AMENDMENT 
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Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31 in pertinent part following 
1985 amendment: 
(1) Whenever all or a portion of the principal sum 
of any obligation secured by a trust deed has, prior to 
the maturity date fixed in such obligation, become due 
or been declared due by reason of a breach or default in 
the performance of any obligation secured by the trust 
deed, including a default in the payment of interest or 
of any installment of principal, or by reason of failure 
of the trustor to pay, in accordance with the terms of 
the trust deed, taxes, assessments, premiums for 
insurance or advances made by the beneficiary in 
accordance with the terms of such obligation or of such 
trust deed, the trustor or his successor in interest in 
the trust property or any part thereof or any other 
person having a subordinate lien or encumbrance of record 
thereon or any beneficiary under a subordinate trust 
deed, at any time within three months of the filing for 
record of notice of default under such trust deed, if the 
power of sale is to be exercised, may pay to the 
beneficiary or his successor in interest the entire 
amount then due under the terms of such trust deed 
(including costs and expenses actually incurred in 
enforcing the terms of such obligation, or trust deed, 
and the trustees' and attorney's fees actually incurred) 
other than such portion of the principal as would not 
then be due had no default occurred, and thereby cure the 
default theretofore existing and, thereupon, all 
proceedings theretofore had or instituted shall be 
dismissed or discontinued and the obligation and trust 
deed shall be reinstated and shall be and remain in force 
and effect the same as if no such acceleration had 
occurred. 
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APPENDIX C 
TRUST DEED NOTE 
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TRUST DEED NOTE 
•DO NOT DESTROY THIS NOTE: When paid , th is no te , wi th Trust Deed securing same, must be 
surrendered to Trustee for cance l l a t i on , before reconveyance w i l l be made. 
U. S. $1,200,000.00 Salt Lake C i t y , Utah 
December 24th, 1979 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, j o i n t l y and severa l l y , promise to pay in U. S. Funds 
to the order of BETTILYON MORTGAGE LOAN CO., at i t s Sal t Lake Off ice in Salt Lake C i t y , 
Utah or at such other p lace, as the holder hereof may designate, ONE MILLION TWO HUNDRED 
THOUSAND and N0/10r DOLLARS ($1,200,000.00) together 
wi th i n te res t from date at the rate of ELEVEN and ONE-HALF (11.5%) per annum on the unpaid 
p r i n c i p a l , Sa :d p r inc ipa l and in te res t payable in U. S. Funds as fol lows: TwcLVE THOUSAND 
EIGHT HUNDRED and NO/100 • DOLLARS ($12,000.00) on the 1st day of 
FEBRUARY, 1980, and the same amount on the same day of each succeeding month u n t i l JANUARY 
1 , 2000, when the en t i re unpaid p r inc ipa l w i th accrued i n te res t shal l become due and payable. 
Each payment shal l be appl ied f i r s t to accrued in te res t and the balance to the reduction 
of p r i n c i p a l . I f any such ins ta l lment or any par t thereof is not paid w i th in Five (5) 
business days a f t e r the due date hereof, the undersigned shal l pay, at the option of the 
no'ider hereof, a " la te charge" o f SIX per cent (6%) of the delinquent insta l lment to 
cover the extra expense involved in handling del inquent payments. 
I f de fau l t occurs f o r Five (5) business days in the payment of said instal lments of p r i n -
c ipa l and in te res t or any par t thereof , the holder hereof, at i t s option and without not ice 
or demand, may declare the e n t i r e p r i nc ipa l balance and accrued i n te res t due and payable, 
whereupon the whole thereof sha l l bear i n t e r e s t at the rate of eighteen per cent (18%) per 
annum, or highest rate permissible under the laws of the State of Utah. 
I f t h i s note is co l lec ted by an attorney a f t e r de fau l t in the payment of p r inc ipa l or 
i n t e r e s t , e i t h e r wi th or wi thout s u i t , the undersigned, j o i n t l y and severa l l y , agree 
to pay a l l costs and expenses of co l l ec t i on inc lud ing a reasonable at torney 's fee. 
The makers, su re t i es , guarantors and endorsers hereby severa l ly waive presentment for 
payment, demand and not ice of dishonor and nonpayment of t h i s note, and consent to any 
and a l l extensions of t ime, renewals, waivers or modi f ica t ion that may be granted by 
the holder hereof wi th respect to the payment or other provisions of th i s note, and 
to release of any s e c u r i t y , or any part t he reo f , w i th or wi thout s u b s t i t u t i o n . 
This note is secured by a Trust Deed of even date herewi th. The undersigned expressly 
states that th i s Trust Deed Note is made f o r business purposes. 
PREPAYMENT PRIVILEGE: 
The loan w i l l be closed to prepayment f o r the f i r s t ten years . Thereaf ter , the Borrower 
w i l l be permit ted to prepay the loan in f u l l dur ing the eleventh year at 105%, decreasing 
1/2 of 1% per year to a minimum of 101%. 
Loan year means any twelve-month period commencing on the f i r s t p r i nc ipa l and in te res t 
ins ta l lment date , and on ewery year l y anniversary t he rea f t e r . 
Th i r ty days w r i t t e n not ice is required f o r any prepayment. 
^ayment during foreclosure w i l l cons t i tu te a prepayment. Such payments, to the extent 
)ermit ted by law, w i l l therefore include the premium required under the prepayment p r i v -
i l ege , o r , i f at that time there shal l be no p r i v i l e g e of prepayment, a premium of 
ILEVEN and ONE-HALF (11.5%) percent of the p r i n c i p a l balance outstanding, shal l be due 
md payable. In the event a tender of payment of the amount necessary to sa t i s f y the en t i r e 
indebtedness evidenced by the Trus t Deed Note and Trust Deed is made at any time p r i o r to 
:he sale under foreclosure of the Trust Deed, i t w i l l cons t i tu te an evasion of the pre-
payment terms and be deemed to be voluntary prepayment. 
SHERWOOD ASSOCIATES, a Utah Limited Partnership 
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Wayne" E. Pearce, General Partner David R. Stewart , General Partner 
Pay to the order of: WASHINGTON NATIONAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY, without recourse. 
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TRUST DEED *-
Willi Assignment of Ken Is Vfc 
THIS TRUST DEED, made t lis ..2.4..t.tl.... day of ....DECEMBER
 t 19.79. 
between .SJ.MWQOD^ASSOCIATE 
s ' ^ 
a ;* 
o 
to 
.., as TRUSTOR, 
cr-y 
whose address is ...4.303 ^O.rt.lL.^P.P.yLtlL.Dr.l.y.?..? ?1919..x .Utah_ 
(Street* iiml numl.cr) (City) 
. .J . . . . . . . .?I™^
 f a s TRUSTEE,* and 
BETTILY0N_^
 f a s BENEFICIARY, 
WITNESSETH: That Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST, 
WITH POWER OF SALE, the following described property, situated in ..V.TAH 
County, State of Utah: 
^Commencing at a point which is SOUTH 79.94 feet and WEST 980.57 feet from the Northeast 
J
 Corner of Section 19, Township 6 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence 
North 68° 25* East 417.00 feet; thence North 84° 57' East 160.00 feet; thence South 81° 31' 
-v-52" East 102.97 feet; thence along the arc of a 766.41 foot radius curve to the right 
"168.13 feet, the chord of which bears North 27° 17' 05" West 167.80 feet; thence along the 
•"arc of a 286.93 foot radius curve to the left 137.72 feet, the chord of which bears North 
;34 45' West 136.40 feet; thence North.48° 30' West 178.86 feet; thence along the arc of a 
^1002.77 foot radius curve to the right 166.26 feet, the chord of which bears North 43 45' 
West 166.08 feet; thence North 39° 00' West 250.32 feet; thence along the arc of a 2628.32 
foot radius curve to the right 49.55 feet, the chord of which bears North 38 27' 34" West 
49.55 feet; thence South 52° 04* 48" West 362.79 feet;thence South 0° 40' 42" West 335.65 
feet; thence South 20° 24' 30" West 98.88 feet; thence South 65° 06' 39" East 39.08 feet; 
thence South 35° 52' 55" East 41.26 feet; thence South 70° 42' 19" East 53.96 feet; thence 
South 55° 05" 10" East 54.25 feet; thence South 25° 31' 15" West 179.58 feet; thence South 
24° 17' 45" East 58.84 feet; thence South 64° 06' 15" East 48.30 feet; thence North 50° 17* 
13"East 158.78 feet to the point of beginning. 
Containing 10.788 acres. 
LESS 0.410 acre of OSMOND BROTHERS (Parcel A) ., A Utah Partnership. 
•Commencing at a point which fs North 425.65 feet and West 895.81 feet from the Northeast 
Corner of Section 19, Township 6 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence 
North 24° 59' 48" West 158.00 feet; thence South 65° 00' 12" West 113.00 feet; thence South 
24u 59' 48" East 158.00 feet; thence North 6bJ 00' 12" East 113.00 feet the point of beginning. 
Containing 0.410 acres. 
' Together with all buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights of 
way, easements, rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances 
thereunto belonging, now or hereafter used or enjoyed wifh said property, or any part thereof, 
SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority hereinafter given to and conferred upon 
Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits; 
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING (1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a pro-
missory note of even date herewith, in the principal sum of $...1.,20Q.>D0.Q».Q0.-..-..;:...- made by 
Trustor, payable to the order of Beneficiary at (he times, in (he manner and with interest as therein 
set forth, and any extensions and/or renewals or modifications thereof; (2) the performance of 
each agreement of Trustor herein contained; (3) the payment of such additional loans or advances as 
hereafter may be made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory 
note or notes reciting that they are secured by this Trust Deed; and (4) the payment of all sums 
expended or advanced by Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof, together with interest 
thereon as herein provided. 
•NOTIC: Trustor* must be a member of the Utah Slate Bar: a bank, building and loon association or savings 
and loan association authorized to do such business in Ulnh: a corporation authorized to do a trust business in 
Utah; or a title insurance or abstract company authorized to do such business in Utah. 
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T O P R O T E C T T H E S E C U R I T Y 0 1 ' T H I S T R U S T D E F D , T R U S T O R A G R E E S : 
1. To keep said proper ty in pood condition and repair ; not to remove or demolish any building thereon, to • 
complete or restore promptly and in good and workmanl ike manne r any building which may be constructed, 
damaged <>r destroyed thereon; to comply with all laws, covenants and restrictions affecting said proper ty ; not 
to commit or permit waste thereof; not to commit. Miller o r permit any act upon said properly in violation of law; to . • 
do all other acts which from the charac ter or use of said proper ty may be reasonably necessary, the specific 
enumerat ions herein not excluding the general; and. if the loan .secured hereby or any part thereof is being ob-
tained for the purpose of financing construction of improvements on said property, Trus to r further agrees: 
(a) T o commence construction promptly and to pursue same with reasonable diligence to completion • .. 
in accordance with plans and s|>cciliealions satisfactory to Beneficiary, and 
(b) T o allow Beneficiary to inspect said p roper ty at all times dur ing construction. 
Trus tee , upon presentat ion to it of an affidavit signed by Beneficiary, sett ing forth facts showing a default 
by Trus to r under this numbered paragraph , is au thor i sed to accept as t rue ami conclusive all facts and state- • • 
ments therein, and to act thereon hereunder . ~ 
2. T o provide and mainta in insurance, of such type or types and amounts as Beneficiary may require , on 
the improvements now ex iting or hereafter erected or placed on said property. Such insurance shall be carried 
in companies approved b\ Beneficiary with loss payable clauses in favor of and in form acceptable to Beneficiary. 
In event of loss. T rus to r s«.all give immediate notice to Bc-eficinry, who may make proof of loss, and each insurance 
company concerned is hereby authorized find directed to make payment for such loss directly lo Beneficiary 
instead of to T rus to r and Beneficiary jointly, and the insurance proceeds, or any par t thereof, may be applied 
by Beneficiary, a t its option, to reduction of the indebtedness hereby secured or to the restoration or repai r of 
the proper ty damaged. 
3. To deliver to, pay for and mainra in with" Beneficiary until the indebtedness secured hereby is paid in full, 
such evidence of title as Beneficiary may require, including abstracts of title or policies of title- insurance and 
any extensions or renewals thereof or supplements thereto. 
4,. T o a p p e a r in and defend any action or proceeding purpor t ing to affect the security hereof, the title to 
said proper ty , or the rights or powers of Beneficiary or T rus t ee ; and should Beneficiary or T rus t ee elect to 
also appea r in or defend any such action or proceeding, to pay all costs and expenses, including cost of evi- '.' 
dencc of title and a t torney 's fees in a reasonable sum incur red by Beneficiary or Trustee . . 
5. T o pay a t least 10 dnys before del inquency all taxes find assessments affecting said proper ty , including 
all assessments upon water company stock and all rents, assessments and charges for water, a p p u r t e n a n t to or 
used in connection with said proper ty; lo pay, when due , all encumbrances, charges, and liens with interest , 
on said proper ty or any par t thereof, which at any l ime appear to be prior or superior hereto; to pay all costs, 
fees, and expenses of this T rus t . 
6. Should T rus to r fail to make any payment or to do any act as herein provided, then Beneficiary or 
Trus tee , but without obligation so to do and without notice to or demand upon Trus to r and without releasing 
T rus to r from any obligation hereof, may : Make or do t he same in such manne r and to such extent as ei ther may . 
deem necessary to protect the security hereof, Beneficiary or T rus t ee being authorized to en te r upon said 
proper ty for such purposes; commence, appea r in and defend any action or proceeding purpor t ing to affect the 
securi ty hereof or the rights of powers of Beneficiary or T rus t ee ; pay, purchase , contest, or compromise any 
encumbrance , charge or lien which in the judgment of e i ther appea r s to be prior or superior hereto; and in ex-
ercising any such powers, incur any liability, expend whatever amounts in its absolute discretion it may deem 
necessary therefor, including cost of evidence of title, employ counsel, and pay his reasonable fees. 
7. T o pay immediately and without demand all sums expended he reunder by Beneficiary or Trus tee , 
with interest from date of expenditure at the rate of tona per cent ^tlUc) per annum until paid, and the repay-
ment thereof shall be secured hereby.
 e j q n t e e n per cen t (18%) or h i g h e s t r a t e p e r m i s s i b l y 6 0 c / 7 
under the laws of the State of Utah. . £/% , 
I T I S M U T U A L L Y A G R E E D T H A T : A^^<X . 
8. Should said proper ty or any pa r t thereof be taken or damaged by reason of any public improvement 
or condemnat ion proceeding, or damaged, by fire, or ea r thquake , or in any other manner , Beneficiary shall be 
enti t led to all compensat ion, awards, and other p a y m e n t s or relief therefor, and shall be entit led at its option 
to commence, a p p e a r in and prosecute in its own n a m e , any action or proceedings, or to make any compro-
mise or set t lement, in connection with such taking or damage . All such compensation, awards, damages, r ights 
of action and proceeds, including the proceeds of any policies of fire and other insurance affecting said proper ty , • 
a re hereby assigned to Beneficiary, who may, after deduct ing therefrom all its expenses, including at torney 's fees, 
apply the same on any indebtedness secured hereby. T r u s t o r agrees to execute such further assignments of any 
compensat ion, award, damages , and rights of action and proceeds as Beneficiary or Trus tee may ' require. 
9. At any t ime and from time to t ime upon wri t t tcn request of Beneficiary, payment of its fees and pre -
sentat ion of this T r u s t Deed and the note for endorsement (in case of full reconveyance, for cancellation and 
re ten t ion) , without affecting the liability of any person for the paymen t of the indebtedness secured hereby, 
T r u s t e e may (a) consent to the making of any map o r plat of said proper ty ; (b) join in grant ing any ease-
ment or creat ing any restriction thereon; (c) join in any subordinat ion or other agreement affecting this T rus t Deed 
or the lien or charge thereof; (d) reconvoy, without war ran ty , all or any par t of said property. T h e grantee in 
any reconveyance may be described as " the person or persons entitled thereto", and the recitals therein of any 
mat te r s or facts shall be conclusive proof of t ru thfulness thereof. Trus to r agrees to pay reasonable Trus tee ' s 
fees for any of the services mentioned in this pa ragraph . 
10. As addit ional securi ty. T rus to r hereby assigns Beneficiary, dur ing the continuance of these trusts, all 
rents, issues, royalties, and profits of the proper ty affected by this T rus t Deed and of any personal proper ty 
located thereon. Until T r u s t o r shall default in the p a y m e n t of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the per-
formance of any agreement hereunder , T r u s t o r J i a l l have the right to collect all such rents, issues, royalties, 
and profits earned prior lo default as they become due and payable . If T rus to r shall default as aforesaid, 
T rus to r ' s right to collect any of such moneys shall cease and Beneficiary shall have the right, with or without 
taking possession of the proper ty affected hereby, to collect all rents, royalties, issues, and profits. Fa i lure or 
discont inuance of Beneficiary at any time or from t i m e to time to collect any such moneys shall not in any 
m a n n e r affect the subsequent enforcement by Beneficiary of the right, power, and authori ty to collect the same. 
Noth ing contained herein, nor the exercise of the r ight by Beneficiary to collect, shall be, or bo construed to 
be, an affirmation by Beneficiary of any tenancy, lease or option, nor an assumption of liability under , nor a 
subordinat ion of the lien or charge of this T r u s t Deed to any such tenancy, lease or option. 
11. Upon any default by Trus to r hereunder , -Beneficiary m a y at any time without notice, ei ther in 
person, by agent, or by a receiver to be appointed by a court (Trus to r hereby consenting to the appoin tment of 
Beneficiary as such receiver) , and without regard to the adequacy of any securi ty for the indebtedness hereby 
secured, enter upon and take possession of said p roper ty or any pa r t thereof, in its own n a m e sue for or 
otherwise collect said rents, issues, and profits, including those past due and unpaid, and apply the same, less 
costs and expenses of operat ion and collection, including reasonable a t torney 's fees, upon any indebtedness 
secured hereby, and in such order as Beneficiary m a y de te rmine . 
12. T h e enter ing upon and taking possession of said proper ly , the collecton of such rents, issues, and 
profits, or the proceeds of fire and other insurance policies, or compensat ion or awards for any taking or 
d a m a g e of said proper ty , and the application or re lease thereof as aforesaid, shall not cure or waive any 
default or notice of default he reunder or invalidate a n y act done pu r suan t to such notice. cr> 
CD 
13. T h e failure o n . the par t of Beneficiary to p rompt ly enforce any right hereunder shall not opera te as ?"* 
a waiver of such right and the waiver by Beneficiary of any default shall not consti tute a waiver of any other P * 
or subsequent default . QQ 
M y T i m e is of the essence hereof. Upon default by T r u s t o r in the payment of any indebtedness secured here- **«^  
by or in the performance of any agreement hereunder , all sums secured hereby shall immediately become due W 
and payable at the option of Beneficiary. In the event of such default, Beneficiary may execute or cause T r u s t e e 
to execute a wri t ten notice of default and of election t o cause said proper ty to be sold to satis/y the obligations >2 
hereof, and T r u s t e e shall file such notice for record in each county wherein said property or some par t or £2 
parcel thereof is s i tuated. Beneficiary also shall depos i t with Trus t ee , the nole and all documents evidencing j ^ j 
expendi tures secured hereby. V * 
^ SHERWOOD ASSOCIATES, A Utah Limited Partnership ' fe 
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DAVID R. STEWART, GenPr* ! P a r t n n r WAYMF F. PFAPPF n«pp r . i l Pr i r tnor 
15. Trustors agree to provide and maintain the following insurance coverage written with \ i 
companies having a Best's rating of A+ or A with mortgagee clauses in favor of the Beneficiary. 
1) Fire and Extended Coverage Insurance for the full insurable value. '." 
2) Public Liability Insurance in amount and terms acceptable to Beneficiary. 
3) Business Interuption Insurance in the amount of $533,000.00. 
4) Other required insurance. C. 
5) All policies shall be kept in force by the Borrower for the life of the loan and C 
shall be held as directed by Beneficiary. £. 
16. Trustor agrees that upon demand of the Beneficiary, Trustor will pay to Beneficiary on/ 
the first day of each month until the note secured hereby is fully paid, together with and" 
in addition to the monthly payments of principal and interest set forth in the Trust Deed Note; 
(a) An installment of the taxes and assessments levied or to be levied against said property, 
and an installment cf the premium or premiums that will become due and payable to renew the 
insurance on the improvements on said property. Such installment shall be equal, respectively, 
to the estimated premium or premiums for such insurance and taxes and assessments next due 
(as estimated by Beneficiary) less all installments already paid therefore, divided by the 
number of months that are to elapse before one month prior to the date when such premium or 
premiums and taxes and assessments will become due. The Beneficiary shall use such monthly 
payments to the extent;that they will suffice to pay such premium or premiums and taxes and 
assessments when due. Beneficiary or its Assignee will not'pay Trustor interest with respect t( 
the funds held, as outlined above. ~ • 
(b) All monthly payments mentioned in the preceding sub-section (a) of Paragraph 16, 
and all payments to be made under the Trust Deed Note securred hereby shall be added together 
and the aggregate amount thereof shall be paid by Trustor each month on the date specified in 
said Trust Deed Note for the payment of monthly installments in a single payment to be allocatec 
by Beneficiary to the following items in the order set forth: 
•• -
 ;
- i Taxes, assessments, insurance premiums; 
••
 :
 ii Interest on the indebtedness secured hereby; , . . 
iii Amortization of the principal of the indebtedness secured hereby. 
Any deficiency in the amount of any such aggregate monthly payment shall constitute an event 
of default under this Trust Deed. ? 
If the total of the payments made by Trustor under (a) hereof shall exceed the amount of pay-
ments1 actually made by Beneficiary for taxes and assessments, or insurance premium, as the case 
may be, such excess, at the election of Beneficiary, shall be credited on subsequent payments -
to be made by Trustor for such1 items; If there shall be-a default under any of the provisions 
of this Trust Deed'resulting in a sale of the property covered hereby, or if Beneficiary 
acquires said property otherwise after default, Beneficiary may apply, at the time of the com-
mencement of;such proceedings, or at the time said property is otherwise acquired, the amount 
then remaining to the credit of Trustor under (a) thereof, as a credit on the interest accrued 
on the note to said date, and the balance, if any, in reduction of the principal amount of 
said indebtedness. : 
17. Trustor agrees to supply Beneficiary a certified annual operation statement for the sub-
ject property and copies of Sherwood Associates audited annual statements within ninety (90) 
days after the close of each calendar or fiscal year during the term of this mortgage. -
Said statement shall contain at least the following information: 
•-• - A. Current Rent Roll, Tenant Roster ' E. Federal & State Income Tax 
B. Gross Rental Income F. Operating Expenses in Reasonable Detail 
C. Other Income and Source * G. Depreciation Deduction (for Federal Income Tax 
D. Real Estate Taxes H. Insurance purposes) 
The statements are to be prepared by a C.P.A. in good standing. 
18. Upon the occurence of any of the following events, the Beneficiary will have the right 
to call the loan and make demand for payment of the unpaid principal and interest balance in 
full, including Prepayment penalty as outlined in Paragraph 25. 
(a) Failure of Trustors to furnish annual operation statements as provided in Paragraph 16. 
Insolvency or business failure or the appointment of a permanent Receiver for any of the 
Trustors or appointment of a Receiver for the property or an assignment for the benefit of cre-
ditors, by, or the filing of a-petition under bankruptcy, receivership, insolvency or debtor 
relief or the pendency of any such petition undismissed for a period of 30-days against any 
endorser or guarantor hereof:or any person now or hereafter liable, absolutely or contingently 
for the payment of the whole or a part of this mortgage; (b) or in the event the described pro-
perty shall be sold or if any person shall gain an interest in the property by deed, contract 
or other conveyance without prior written consent of Beneficiary, or by operation of law. 
•'
 :
 " • "•'.'* (over) 
, i . . . . . . 
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19. EMINENT DOMAIN: 
The proceeds of any award or claim for damages, direct or consequential, in connection 
with any condemnation of or injury to the property, or part thereof, or for conveyances 
in lieu of condemnation, are hereby assigned and shall be paid to the Beneficiary. 
20. Trustor agrees that in the event any of the subject property is sold during the term of 
this Trust Deed, without the prior written approval of the Beneficiary, the Beneficiary rese 
the right to either call the loan or approve the purchaser as a satisfactory purchaser or 
trustor. Trustor agrees that no secondary financing is permitted on the secured property 
without the prior written approval of the Beneficiary. Approval or disapproval of the above 
shall not be unreasonably withheld by the Beneficiary. 
21. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: 
It is agreed the- if any part of said premises is of a nature so that the security 
interest therein can be-perfected under the Uniform-Commercial Code, at adopted and in effect 
from time to time in Utah, this instrument shall constitute a Security Agreement and Trustor 
agrees to join with the Beneficiary in the execution of any financing statement and to execut 
any other instruments that may be required for the perfection or renewal of such security int 
est under said Uniform Commercial Code. 
22.- ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS AND PROFITS: 
As additional security and collateral for the indebtedness secured by this Trust Deed,- trusts 
agrees to the terms and conditions of the Assignment of Rents and Profits of even date execut 
ed by the trustor covering the subject property. 
23. -That as additional and collateral security for the payment of the indebtedness,'Trustor 
hereby assigns to Beneficiary all of thebonus, rents, royalties, Tights and benefits accru-
ing under all oil, gas or mineral leases on said property, or which may hereafter be placed 
thereon, including all water and riparian rights, and the lessee or assignee or sublessee is 
hereby directed upon production by the holder of the indebtedness secured hereby of a certif-
ied copy thereof, to pay said bonus, rents, royalties,-rights, -and-benefits to the owner of 
said debt; this provision to become effective, however, only upon secured, such direction to 
terminate and become null and void upon payment of the indebtedness hereby secured. Any amoj 
received by Beneficiary under this provision shall be applied to the reduction of indebtednes 
secured hereby. 
24. The Trustors hereby waive any and all rights of redemption from sale under any;order or 
decree of foreclosure of this Trust Deed on its behalf and on behalf of each and every person 
except decree or judgment creditors of the Trustors,- acquiring any interest in or title to t\v 
premises subsequent to the date of this Trust Deed. Trustor hereby waives any and all redemp 
tion rights in the event of Foreclosure. 
25. PREPAYMENT PRIVILEGE: 
The loan will be closed to prepayment for the first ten years. Thereafter the Borrower will 
be permitted to prepay the loan in full at 105%, decreasing 1/2 of 1% per year to a minimum 
of 101%.-Loan year means any twelve-month period commencing on the first principal and in-
terest installment date, and on every yearly anniversary thereafter. 
Payment during foreclosure will constitute a prepayment. 'Such payments, to the extent perm-
itted by law, will therefore include the premium required under the prepayment, a premium of 
11.5 per cent of the principal-balance outstanding, shall be due and payable.•• In the event 
a tender of payment of the amount necessary to satisfy the entire indebtedness evidenced by 
the Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed is made at any time prior to the sale under foreclosure of 
the Trust Deed, it will constitute an evasion of the prepayment terms and be deemed to be a 
voluntary prepayment. .- : - .< 
26. After the lapse of such time as may then be required by law following-the recordation of 
said notice of default, and notice of:default and notice of sale having been given at'then 
required by. law, Trustee, without demand on Trustor, shall sell said property on the date and 
at the time and place designated in said notice of sale, either as a whole or in seperate 
parcels, and in such order as it may determine (but subject to any statutory right of Trustor 
to 'direct'the order in which such property, if consisting of•several known lots or parcels, 
shall be sold), at public auction to the highest bidder, the purchase price payable in lawful 
money of the United States at the time of sale. The person conducting the sale may, for 
any cause he deems expedient, postpone the sale from time to-time until it shall be complet-
ed and, in eyery case, notice of postponement shall be given by public declaration thereof 
by such person at the time and place last appointed for the sale; provided, if the sale is 
postponed for longer than one day beyond the day designated in the notice of sale, notice 
thereof shall be given in the same mannerfas the original notice of sale. Trustee shall 
execute and deliver to the purchaser its Deed conveying said property so sold, but without 
SHERWOOD ASSOCIATES, a Utah Limited Partnership 
David R. StewartT'Gene>al Partner 
By: W^?*"*^ -X^«g-*-*ur 
Wayne E /Pea rce , General Partner QD 
O 
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any cove::.-n-r or warranty, express .,r implied. The recitals in the Deed ot any matters or 
facts she!^ be conclusive proof of the truthfulne.j thereof. Any person, including Benefic-
iary may bid at the sale. Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale to payment of (1) 
the costs and expenses of exercising the power of. sale and of the sale, including the pay-
ment of the Trustee's and attorney's fees; (2) cost of any evidence of title procured in 
connection with such sale and revenue stamps on Trustee's Deed; (3) all sums expended under 
the terms hereof, not then repaid, with accrued interest at 18% per annum or highest rate 
permissible under the laws of the State of Utah from date of expenditure; (4) all other sums 
then secured hereby; and (5) the remainder, 1f any, to the person or persons legally entitled 
thereto, or the Trustee, in its discretion, may deposit the balance of such proceeds with 
the County in which the sale took place. 
27. Upon the occurance of any default hereunder, Beneficiary shall have the option to declare 
all sums secured hereby immediately due and payable and foreclose this Trust Deed in the 
manner provided by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property and Beneficiary 
shall be entitled to recover in such proceesing all costs and expenses incident thereto 
including a reasonable attorney's fee in such amount as shall be fixed by the court. 
28. Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing for record in the. 
office of the Ccunty Recorder of each county in which said property or some part thereof 
is situated, a substitution of trustee. From the time the substitution is filed for record, 
the new trustee shall succeed to all the powers, duties, authority and title of the trustee 
named herein or of any successor trustee. Each such substitution shall be executed and 
acknowledged, and notice thereof shall be given and proof thereof made, in the manner provided 
by law. 
29. This Trust Deed shall apply to! inure to the benefit of,' and bind all parties hereto, 
their heirs, legatees, devisees, administators, executors, successors and assigns. All obli-
gations of Trustor hereunder are joint and several. The term "Beneficiary" shall mean the 
owner and holder, including any pledgee, of the note secured hereby. In this Trust Deed, when-
ever the context requires, the masculine gender includes the feminine and/or neuter, and the 
singular number includes the plural. 
30. Trustee accepts this Trust when this Trust Deed, duly executed and acknowledged, is made 
a public record as provided by law. Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto of 
pending sale under any other Trust Deed or of any action of proceeding in which Trustor, 
Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be a party, unless brought by Trustee. 
31. This Trust Deed shall be construed according to the laws of the State of Utah. 
32. The undersigned Trustor request that a copy of any notice of default and of any notice 
of sale hereunder be mailed to him at the address hereinbefore set forth. 
SHERWOOD ASSOCIATES, A Utah Limited Partnership 
BY: B Y: Lts&*^+*-' £ <zf%**—*=-< 
DAVID R. STEWART, General Partner WAYNE E. PEARCE, General Partner 
STATE OF UTAH ) ' 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) . 
On the ^ ^ f i v # 4 # ^ December , 1979, personally appeared before me DAVID R. STEWART, who 
being-^yirhe^qJy^Wb^n did say that he is a General Partner of SHERWOOD ASSOCIATES, A Utah 
Limited^rtnersfi^'j^and that the foregoing Instrument was signed in behalf of said Partner-
ship: by/'authorirty-pf/'jts articles of Partnership, and said DAVID R. STEWART, acknowledged to 
me that'••said Partnership executed the same. 
My c omm i s s:,1 oji W x pi re's/ • AA>^\A J VY^rrr^\^> 
•.''.^/''••j/Q/Qn-''***/-' Not a m Public residing at: 
• •'''
t
'''->.L^;;fi:' Hoyt S. Wimpr. Bountiful, Utah 
STATE OF UTAH" ) 
COUNTY OF UTAH j 
ss. 
On the „.24.tfrr>.d.ay of December , 1979, personally appeared before me WAYNE E. PEARCE, who 
being.:bVy'nJC*aaiy.;*"swprn did say that he is a General-Partner of SHERWOOD ASSOCIATES, A Utah 
limi$ed^P,artn$rtSljipti and that the foregoing instrument was signed in behalf of said Partner 
ship\i3>..-^uthoniy^9'f; its articles of Partnership, and said WAYNJEE. PEARCE, acknowledged to 
me 'ithat. s^d^Pariner^hip executed the same. . ^^-—-^ 
My^ppn^siW^pires': A4W J Vr^ __ 
'•••'vVv- •l'l/8/8>Q^-': "~~ N o p r y Public residing at: fo 
Sf., \ * i'o^y Hoyt S. Wimer, Bountiful, Utah CC 
50572 | 
CO 
H> 
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(To be used only when indebtedness secured oruby has been paid in lull) 
T O . T R U S T E D . 
T h e undersigned is the le;ral owner and holder of the note and all other indebtedness secured 
hy the wilnir. Trust; Deed. Said note, together with all oil KM* indebtedness secured by said Trus t 
Deed has been i'uiiy paid and satisfied; and you are hereby requested and dhected, on payment 
to you oi any sums owin^ lo you under the terms of said T r us t Deed, to cancel said note above 
mentioned, and all other evidences of indebtedness secured by said T r u s t Deed delivered to you 
herewith, t oge the r 'w i th the said T rus t Deed, a n d to reconvev, wi thout warranty, to the parties 
designated by the terms of said T rus t Deed, all the es ta te now held by you thereunder. 
Da ted : 19..J. 
By: 
WASHINGTON NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
Mail reconveyance to 
j;x;*'T3resmaIT'V.i'ce'Tf°sIUerit: 
..Attest^ 
'••'•' J.W. Craig, Ass.i-:t ant Secretary 
Q 
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APPENDIX E 
SECURITY AGREEMENT 
2088-7L.PL2 
PROMISSORY NOTE (Interest) 
The „«d«M «j««d « " « y 0 " d • • • « o » r P • - • • »• P°r • * • •'«<«' • ' 
„ Utah ec ol MtK eih«r oie<« «» He Ko'd«# h«f*ol «oy d«» gnole 
, OOIIOM (J J poyob'e ai follo-i 
wr I ng the »<"* °» 
udn'"*"' ~ »h nleresl on Ihe unpa d bolonce Ihereot J om dolt ««l I po d ol Ihe fat* ol par <»nl { 7. } together bo h before ond oft. 
per onitui" n»er«i» poyob e ot to It 
frepoyment ol »N«* nol« w IS uteres! to dole of poymertl may be mode o» any I m« * ll ow» penalty 
If Ihe holder deems Itelf ntecuce or f delawtl b* mnd> n poymer.1 of the whole or any p a l of o«y ntlallmml ol the t me when o lh» place 
where Ihe iome bt«om«t due and poyoble at o/oreio d hen he e«« e unpad balance wlh nleretl at aforetad iholl ol lhn eled on of he holder 
hereof ond w Ihoul noi <e of to d elect on ol -on<e become due and pa oble In e»eol of any tuch delaull or accele o o« Ihe undtri c«<-d o n y and 
jevciolly ogree to pay to Ihe holder hereof a onoble ollorney s (ee» legal r«peni«i ond lawful colled on cotli n odd I on to ell o her sums doe 
hercu der 
demand prolett not ce of d ihonor ond extent on of t n c w Scut nol ce are hereby wo »ed ond the underi gned conienl lo Ihe 
any pari (hereof w Ih or w Iho I tub t lot on 
This Secur i ty Agreement i s pa r t o f the»
 M D I T V A r o e n M P M T 4.4. L ^ j n r r i £:,«*«,— ,,« c*-^4-^^««4- «-P SECURITY AGREEMENT 
attachedUCC-1 Financing Statement of „ , „
 n kl l t w , , . j _ j . - Ibquipmenf, Consumer Goods and Fixtures, But Not Motor Vehicles} 
even date . M ^ 
.
 f h , 2 5 ^ h _ _ . day of „ D E C E [ 1 G E R i9 7 9 SHERWOOD .ASSOCIATES j A_ UT . . L I M I T E D . PART I E ° S H P 
blor hereby ogrees with ond grants lo E E T T X L Y O l l MORTGAGE -LOAH CO - . Secured Forty o lecunty Interest in the follow ng properly 
11 present and fu tu re machinery, equipment, material ,--appl iances and f i x tu res now or hereaf ter 
n s t a l l e d or placed by Debtor i n the premises fo r the generation and d i s t r i b u t i o n of a i r , water, 
e a t , e l e c t r i c i t y , l i g h t , fuel or r e f r i g e r a t i o n , or fo r v e n t i l a t i n g or a i r - cond i t i omng purposes, 
r f o r san i ta ry or drainage purposes, or f o r the exclusion o f vermin or insects , or fo r the re-
oval o f dus t , refuse of garbage, and inc lud ing a l l awnings, windo/shades, drapery rods and 
-acke ts , screens, f l o o r cover ings , i n c i n e r a t o r s , carpet ing and a l l f u rn i t u re and f i x t u res used 
i the operat ion of the b u i l d i n g s , together w i th a l l addi t ions t o , subst i tu t ions for, changes in 
~ replacements o f the whole or any part o f any or a l l o f said a r t i c l e s of property. 
i oil oddi) ons ond oecesi oni thereto herein collectively colled Iho Collateral !o secure all Debtor i present ond future debti obi gal oni and I ob 1 t ei of what 
r nature to Secured Party (Ihe Obi gal oni J , Inelud ng the nolo executed by Debtor to Secured Party n the amount of $ - 1 . , 2 0 0 . , 0 0 0 - ^ 0 0 and Debtors 
gal oni hereunder 
A W A R R A N T I E S 
Debtor -warrants 
1 USP The Collateral s used or boughf for use pr manly for (check onej i Q perional family or household purposes /Q3 h«» nen Q farm ng operat oni 
2 PURCHASE MONEY — If checked here Q the Collateral u be ng ocqu red by Debtor with the proeeedi of a loan from Secured Parly, wh eh proceeds w II 
jsed for no other purpose ond Secured Parly may disburse such proceeds d redly to Ihe seller of the Collateral 
3 LOCATION OF COLLATERAL The Collafcrof w II bo kept w l h n the Stale of Utah al the address below Debtors s gnature {or if not ol 
4303 Mo F o o t h i l l Dr Pro/o , Utah 84601 _ _ ,
 ond wI1 no, b. removed , h e r e „ o r n w(hou, pror Wl l l t f l eonlen, of Sacured Parly 
4 MOBILE EQUIPMENT — If any Collateral Is equ pmonl normally used In bus ness or forming operat ons in more lhan one slate Debtors ch ef place of 
ness s af the address below Debtor s s gnoture (or If nol of .. ) Debtor 
mmed olely g ve wr lien nol ce to Secured Party of any change in such ch ef place of bus ness 
5 FIXTURES The Collateral is not & lached or Jo be attached lo real estate unless checked here Q (Balance appl cable only f box checked ) If the Col 
al is or vriH become a f xture lo real estate Ihe legal description of such reol estate 1st ^FQR LEGAL DESCRIPTION SEE BELOLi 
the name of Ihe record owner of such real estate 1st 
SHERW00D_ASS0CIATES, A UTAH LIMITED PARTNERSHIP and Debtor 
furn ih Secured Porly w (h discla men s gned by all port es hov ng interests n Ihe reol estole which are pr or lo the Inleresf of Secured Parly n the Collaleiol 
6 OWNEPSHIP —• Debtor has clear I lie to Ihe Collateral free of all encumbrances and security interests olher than this Agreement ©» 
B PERSONS BOUND S 
Each person signing Ihls Agreement other lhan the Secured Parly, Is a Debtor and ail obi gallons ol all Debtors are join! and several QQ 
C OTHER PROVISIONS Q 
LEGAL DESCRIPTION 
SEE ATTACHED EXHIBIT "A" 
8 
THIS AGREEMENT 1NCLUDE5 ALL THE PROVISIONS ON THE REVFR5E. SIDE, _ - . , , ™ . , , 
SHhKHUOD ASSOLffi iK, A U^yjMITED/ARTNEPcSHI 
DAVID R. STEUAMT General Partner t r 
'Hdytv S. Wimer; Vice President , S n u y i / p . wirrer, v ice r^resiaeni: y yp 
333 (J/. 2IQ0 „ S o _ .
 D.hIOfl /ts**&**?f d e -
s a l t LakP C.itv. ilhari AAiiq WAYNE E. PEARCE, S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84115 WAYNE E. PEARCE, General Partner" 
CO . SCCUAITY ACftCCMCMT OTHCM THAN MOIOM VCM 
ADDITIONAL SECURITY AGREEMENT PROVISIONS 
1. FILING Debtor warrant! (hot there it no financing statement now on file in any public office covering any of the Colloleral or any of the proceedi thereof 
and 10 lonq ot any o( the Obligation* remain unpaid. Oeblor will not execute a financing ilalfm«nl or security agreement covering the Co'lolerol with anyone 
Other than Secured Parly. Deblor agree* to tign and deliver one or more tinoncing statement* or jupplemenl* thereto or other imlrumtnli ot Secured Party moy 
from time to lime require to comply with Ihe Utah Umlorm Commercial Code or other applicable law or to prejerve, protect ond enforce the «ccurily mlereil of Se-
cured Party and lo pay all coilt of tiling juch ilotemenli or instrument*. Secured Party ii aulhoriicd to lign luch Halementt or inttrumenl* for Deblor. * 
2. CARE OF PROPERTY — Deblor shall: keep Ihe Collateral in good ripair and be reipontible (or any lo*t or damage lo il; keep il free from all lient, 
encurnbrancei and lecunly inlereil*; pay when due oil taxe*, ticente fee* ond other chorget upon ili nol sell, mnute, conceal or in any way dispoie of it or permit 
it lo be u*ed unlowlully or (or hire or contrary to Ihe provitioni of any iniurance coverage! not permit it lo bectme a fixture or an acce*tion to other good* except 
as ipecificolly oulhoriied in writing by Secured Parly, lot* of or damage to the Collateral sholl nol releote ' cblor from ony of Ihe obligation*. 
3. INSURANCE — Deblor ogree*, j t u.i» expjnie. to in«ure Ihe Collalerol anoint.' lost, damage, theft (ond «uch other riikj o* Secured Porty moy require) lo 
the full insurable volue thereof with ir.turance :cnoinie i and under policies and in form satisfactory to Secured Porty. Proceed* 'rom Ihe insurance shall be poyobl-
to Secured Parly a* it* inlcre*l moy appear on t i l policie* ihall provide for 10 day* minimum written cancellation notice to Secured Porty. Upon requetf, policiet 
or cerlificalci alleging the coverage iholl be d.^oiifed with Secured Party. Jniurance proceed* moy be applied by Secured Party toward payment of ony of The 
Obligation*, whether or nol due, in *uch order of applicolion at Secured Party may determine. 
4. RIGHT TO PROTECT — If Debtor foil* lo ,-iake any payment or perform ony act required by Ihi* Agreement or which Secured Parly dcemi adviioble to pre-
»erve the Collalerol or the priority or perfection of Ihe Secured Party'* tecurity intercjf, Secured Parly moy advance fund* for the *ame and *uch advance* jhall be 
one of the Obligation* t»rt>red hereby ond *hall be immediately payable with a finance charge thereon at the maximum lawful rate or, if any of Ihe Obligation* 
lecured hereby ( o m l ^ a coniumerjoan under the provisions of the Utah Uniform Consumer Credit Code, ol Ihe highesJ annual percentage role applicable to 
any such obiigatian^/rurther i den 1i f i ed by Exh ib i t "A1' - Legal Descr ipt ion f ] / ) ( ' ^^/p 
5. DEFAULT —. Debtor shall be in default hereunder if any of the following event* occur: [)) Debtor foil* lo pay any of the Obligation* when due; (2) 
Debtor foils to perform ony undertaking or breaches any warronly in Ihi* Agreement or in any of Ihe Obligation*; (3) any *lotement, reprejentation or warranty 
of Debtor herein or in any other-writing al ony lime furnished by Deblor to Secured Parly it untrue in ony material retpect when made; (4) Debtor become* insolvent 
or unable to pay debt* a* they mature or make* an alignment for the benefit of creditor* or any proceeding it instituted by or again*! Deblor alleging that Deblor 
it iniolvent or unable lo pay debit ot they molure; (5) enlry of any judgment ogainit Debtor; (A) death of Debtor who it a natural perton or of any partner of 
Debtor which it a partnerihip; (7) dissolution, merger or contolidation or tron*fer of a substantial part of the property of Deblor which it a corporation or o port-
nenhip; (3} an attachment, gornijhmenf, execution or other procest it ittued or a lien filed again*! ony property of Debtor; (9) Irantfer of ony inlereit in ony of 
Ihe Colloleral without Ihe written content of Secured Parfy; (10) ony of the Collateral it lot!, tlolen or materially damaged; (11) Secured Party »hall deem iljelf 
insecure for any reaton whatsoever. Waiver of ony default tholl not constitute a woiver of any tubtequenl defoull. 
6. REMEDIES — Upon'lhe occurrence of any defoull hereunder and at any lime thereafter all of Ihe Obligations shall, al the election of Secured Party and 
without notice of such election, become immediately dw and poyable and Secured Porty ihall have the remedies of a tecured porty under the Utah Uniform Com. 
mereiol Code or other applicable law, and: (1) Secured Parly tholl have the right to enter upon any premiset where the Colloterol may be ond take possession 
thereof; (2) Debtor thall, if requetted by Secured Parfy, assemble the Collateral ot a place deiignaled by Secured Porly; (3) Secured Party may sell, lease or other-
wise dispote of any or oil of lh« Collateral ond, after deducting the expense* incurred by Secured Party, including reasonable otlorneyt' feet and legal expenses, 
apply the residue ogointl the; Obligationt; [4) Secured Parly may give any notice to Debtor required by law by moiling juch notice, postage prepaid, of least S 
days before Ihe event lo any address of Deblor set forth in thit Agreement; and (S) Secured Parly shall have the right immediately and without prior notice or de-
mand to set off against the Obligation*, whether or not due, oil money or other amount* owed by Secured Party in any capacity lo Debtor and Secured Porty shall 
be deemed lo have exerciied such right of teloff and la have made a charge against any luch money or amount* immediately upon occurrence of such default even 
though such charge it entered in fhe bookt of Secured Parly subsequent thereto. 
7. GENERAL -— Secured Party may inspect the Collateral wherever located ot ony reasonable time. Secured Party is authorized to date this instrument and 
fill in any blanks. All words uted herein shall be construed to be of such gender and number as Ihe circumstance* require ond all reference* lo Debtor sholl 
include all other per*ons primorily or secondarily liable hereunder. This Agreement is governed by Ihe law* of the State of Utah. Debtor appoint* the County Clerk 
of the county in which the place specified in the address of Secured Party is loco led. as agent for the purpose of accepting service of process in any action pertain-
ing to this Agreement and agrees that any such action may be brought in any court of said county. Any provisions hereof found lo be involid sholl not invalidate 
the remainder. This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the parties ond may nol be altered or amended except by written ogreement of the parlies. 
This Agreement binds each Deblor, Iheir respective heirs, personal representatives, successors and assigns, and inures lo the benefit of Secured Parly, ils successors 
and assigns. 
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^Legal *1 Description attached to read Exhibit "A" to UCC-1 Financing 
statement and Security Agreement dated December 24, 1979. " ~ m^ * 
Commencing at a point which is SOUTH 79.94 feet and WEST 980.57 
feet from the Northeast Corner of Section 19, Township 6 South, 
Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 68° 25 ! 
East 417.00 feet; thence North 84° 57 ' East 160.00 feet; thence 
.South 81° 31 ' 52" East 102.97 foot; thence along the ;irc of a 
706.4 1 foot r.-uliw:; curve (o the rt^ liL 1 Gtt . 13 IVot. , C he chord 
of which bears North 27° 17' 05" West 107.80 i.'eet; Llu-ncc along 
the arc of a 286.93 foot radius curve to the left 137.72 feet, 
the chord of which bears North 34° 45f West 136.40 feet; thence 
North 48° 30! West 178.86 feet; thence along the arc of a 1002.77 
.foot: radius curve to the right 166.26 feet, the chord of which 
bears North 43° 45' West 166.08 feet; thence North 39° 00' West 
250.32 feet; thence along the arc of a 2628.32 foot radius curve 
to the right 49.55 feet, the chord of which bears North 38° 27f 
34" West 49.55 feet; thence South 52° 04' 48" West 362.79 feet; 
thence South 0° 40' 42" West 335.65 feet; 
30M West 98.88 feet; thence South 65° 06' 
thence South 35° 52f 55" East 41.26 feet; 
thence South 55° 05' 
15" West 179.58 feet 
thence South 64° 06f 
13" East 158.78 feet 
19" East 53.96 feet; 
thence South 25° 31' 
45" East 58.84 feet; 
thence North 50° 1 7 ' 
thence South 20° 24f 
39" East 39.08 feet; 
thence South 70° 42 f 
10" East 54.25 feel-
thence South 24° 17 
15" East 48.30 feet; 
to the point of beginning, 
Containing 10.788 acres* 
LESS 0.410 acre of OSMOND BROTHERS (Parcel A ) , a Utah Partnership 
Commencing at a point which is North 425.65 feet and West 895.81 
feet from the Northeast Corner of Section 19, Township 6 South, 
Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence North 24° 59' 
48" West 158.00 feet; thence South 65° 00 ! 12" West 113.00 feet; 
thence South 24° 59' 48" East 158.00 feet; thence North 65° 00' 
.12" East 113.00 feet the point of beginning. 
Containing 0.410 acres, 
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. . _.» , ,., piu'v-"*1-—i lu J »«'"ty ulhcei tui l i lmy ijutsuunt to the Unil ! 
Commercial Code. f y [' • 
1. Oebtor(s) (Last Nome First) and addresx . / 
SilERWOpO ASSOCIATES,A Ut. Limithd BETTILYOM MORTGAGE LOAM CO 
Partnership 
4303 Ho. Footh i l l Dr. 
Provft,, jaahJ4601 
Emp. Fed. I.D. No. 87 -00334137 
2.' Secured Pnrty(ies) and address(es) 
P.O. BOX 15749 -
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH G4U5 
4. This Financing Statement covers the fol lowing types (or items) of property: 
SEE ATTACHED SECURITY AGREEMENT OF EVEN 
DATE FOR DESCRIPTION OF ADDITIONAL *-
SECURITY. $. 
6. Gross sales price 
of collateral 
The Secured party is is not-
Purchase money lender of the collateral. 
. a seller or or use tax paid to State of 
.Sales 
tCj . j J 53 rK fa 
(Nuj Lfl 
ft A • , - - C }/•" 'iy":\t 
For Filing Officer (Date, Time, Number, 
and Filing Office) ' * 
WASHINGTON NATIONAL INS. C 
Investment Department; 
Evans ton,' ILT' 60201 ' J 
5. Assignee(s) of Secured Party and 
Address(es) 
This statement is filed wi thout the debtor's signature to perfect a security interest in collateral. (Check [x] if so) 
LJ already subject to a security interest in another jurisdiction when it was brought into this state. 
• 
which is proceeds of the original collateral described above in which a security interest was perfected: 
Microf i lm No. 
Check [x] if covered: Proceeds of Collateral are also covered. Q Products of Collateral are also covered. No. of additional Sheets presented: 
Filed with the secretary of State of The State of Utah, ' 
3„ Maturity date (if any): 1 / 1 / 2 0 0 0 Approved by David S. Monson, 
SHERWOOD ASSOCIATES, A UTAH LIMITED PARTNERSHIP'-00"""0^56"9^ o f S t 3 t e ' f ° f theSuta ° r u ^ 
BY: 
Uavid K. Stewart, General Partner RFTTILY0i{ MORTGAGE. LOAN CO. 
^ ( 5 w 
By, 
WAYNF H . FhAWfekoature(s) of Debtor(s) B y ,JUl I V ;—r^ 
STANDARD FORM - FORM UCCM. 
Slgnature(s) of Secured Party(les) 
(4) SECURED PARTY COPY 
zR\-lC0 .ASSOCIATES , a Utah f 
•i'mi tea'Partnership 
•303 No. Foothill Dr. 
rovo, UT. 84601 
>ciai Security No _ 
Secured Party des) nn<l nddi cosies) [ 
„WASHINGTON NATIONAL INSURANCE,-; 
Investment Department 
Evans ton, IL. 60201 
ip. Fed. l.O. No.. 87-0334137 
ANY 
This statement refers to original Financing Statement bearing File No . . 
December 28 79 
ate Filed ' 9 Maturity Date , 
760506 
January 1 ftx2000 
SECOND KCCOKOIN5. 
2212 
For Filing Officer (Date, Time and Filing 
Office) 
O Continuation. The original financing statement between the forcyomg Debtor ami Secured Party,, bearing (tie number shown above, is still ellective. 
O Termination. Secured party no longer claims a security intetcst under the financing statement bearing file numliuf shown above, 
Q Assignment. The secured party's right under the financing statement bearing file numtwr shown above to the property described in Item 10 have been assigned to the 
v assignee whose name and address appears in Item 10. ^ _^ «_ ^  _^ 
_i Amendment. Financing Statement bearing file number shown above is amended as set forth in Item JO. *"jf H J? \^ ^ t J\J 
"2 Partial Release Secured Pmiy releases the collateral described in Itirm 10 bom the financing statement bearing file numtwr shown above. 
Legal Description attached to read'Exhibit "A11 to UCC-1 Financing Statement and 
Security Agreement dated December 24
 3 1979.* ' 
Additional Security Agreement provisions #4 to include the wording, "further 
identif ied by Exhibit "A" - Legal Description attached" as outlined in C of the 
provisions. 
CC 
c 
•\5 
y=4mit^d Partners trip" 
No. of additional Sheets presented: 
f%3' J ^ f y ^ L f ^ r a i ^ ^ i ¥ PETTILYON MORTGAGE L0AN..C0-. . M . . r C -,-^w^'S^Ct1yr Loan Correspondent for Washington Nati Stewart3 Geri. Partner 
lecrssnrv onlyJf item RJs nnqlicnble 
•^FiPaLic^n. T a r i n g 
J"Df'' 
% rsoqlicable). 
7\NDARD FORM • FORM AJCC-S 
oa^l 
JbW*\r / : 
^9X^"S^•3in^r'Te(s l0 'SeeuredP3f ,v< ies , Vice Pres 
STANDARD FORM 
UNIFORM COM. ^ C I A L CODE - FINANCING STATEMENT -
07-01-06 (R©v. 1/77) 
1M UCC-1 IN:, ."PUCTIONS5 
1. PLE/ S£ ?YP6 r.T'i fQrm. Fold orWy along perforation for mailing. 
2. Remove Secured Party and Debtor copies and send otrwr 3 COUKJ with Intarleavcd carbon paper to the (Ding officer. Enclose fifing f««„ The filing fee U $2.00 lot each nam* 
listed in th« Oebtors box with Soc. S<JC. No, anu/or Emp. Fed. Tan 1.0. No., otherwise the fee It S 10.00. 
3. If the space provided tor any itemlsl on the form is inadequate the ttemf.il should be continued on additional sheets, Preferahly S" X 8" or 8" X 10". Only on* copy of such 
additional sheets ne?q be presented to the filing officer «mh a sat of thre* coptos of the finoncing stwtemant. Long Kh*dul«» of collateral. Indentur**. etc.. may be on any 
siJte paper that is convenient for th* secured party. Indicate the number of addition*! sheets attached. 
4. It coltaterjl is crops or goods which are or are to become fixtures, describe generally th* root estat* and giv* nam* of record Owner. 
5. When a copy of the security agreement is used as a financing statement, it is requested that it be accompanied by * completed but unsigned set of these formt. without 
extra fee. 
6. At th* time of original filing, filing officer should return third copy at en acknowledgment. At a later time, secured party may data and sign Termination Legend and use third 
coov as a Termination Statement. 
T h i s F I N A N C I N G S T A T E M E N T is p resen ted t o a f i l i n g o f f i c e r f o r f i l i n g p u r s u a n t t o t he U n i f o r m 
C o m m e r c i a l C o d e . 
• Kelly Co. • 1044» 
1 . Deb to r (s ) {Last N a m e F i rs t ) and address(es) 
iRWOOD ASSOCIATES, A Ut . Limi 
-tnership 
)3iio. Foothill Dr. 
> ^ a , » y ^ 0 1 _ _ 
Emp. Fed. I.D. No. „ 87-Q334J 37 
2 . Secured Par ty ( ies) and address(es) 
e d
 BETTILYON MORTGAGE LOAN CO. 
P.O. BOX 15749 
SALT LAKE CITY,UTAH 84115 
4 . Th is F i nanc ing S t a t e m e n t covers the f o l l o w i n g t ypes (or i tems) o f p r o p e r t y : 
SEE ATTACHED SECURITY AGREEMENT OF EVEN*3" o f T o V ^ r " 
DATE FOR DESCRIPTION OF ADDITIONAL 
SECURITY. $ " 
T h e Secured p a r t y js_ 
. is not- . a seller or 
Purchase m o n e y lender o f the c o l l a t e r a l . 
o r use tax p a i d t o 
Sta te o f 
. Sales 
JSO£T« 65% 
C*> 
C D 
C D 
F o r F i l i n g O f f i ce r ( D a t e , T i m e . N u m b e r . Q Q 
and F i l i n g Of f i ce ) r~"\ 
WASHINGTON NATIONAL INS. "Sb. 
Investment Department ^ 
EVANSTON, 1.60201 ~ . 
Cn 
Assignee(s) o f Secured Par t y and £-*s * 
-GO Adi i ress(es) Th is s ta temen t is f i l ed w i t h o u t the deb to r ' s s igna tu re t o pe r f ec t a secu r i t y in te res t in c o l l a t e r a l . (Check [ x ] i f so) 
D a l ready sub jec t t o a secu r i t y in te res t i n a n o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n w h e n i t was b r o u g h t i n t o thb> s ta te . 
• which is proceeds of the original collateral described above in which a security interest was perfected: 
M i c r o f i l m N o 0 
Co 
CD 
S 
C h e c k [ x j if c o v e r e d : Proceeds of Co l l a te ra l are also cove red . Q Produc ts of Co l l a t e ra l are also cove red . N o . of add i t i ona l Sheets p resen ted : r " 
F-MPH w'-ith 1lf*h r.mmty Recorder 's O f f i c e 
3„ M a t u r i t y da te ( i f a n y ) : 1 / 1 / 9 0 0 0 
^HEfiUQOMSSflCIAIE" " "' " 
A p p r o v e d b y D a v i d S. M o n s o n , 
, , , . . , , „ * , . L t . G o v e r n o r / Secre ta ry o f S ta te , f o r the State of U t a h 
tafo-fo mtpdjjji pme rs ha \L 
£ 
David R. Stewart, General Partner 
By; A / ^ H ^ g? ,-^^-t^L^ _ 
WAYNE E. PEAR&E^'^nfcTO^'Pfcrtner 
BETTILYON MORTGAGE LOAN CO. 
B y 
Hoyt S 
4/- J- r (s) of Secured P<uty(les) r ^ 
APPENDIX F 
GUARANTY 
2088-7L.PL2 
\W^' 
40G1.0 
G U A R A N T Y 
IN CONSIDERATION of the mortgage financing accommodations extended to SHERWOOD ASSOCIATES, 
A Utah Limited Partnership, (hereinafter referred to a "Borrower"), by BETTILYON MORTGAGE 
LOAN CO., (hereinafter referred to as "Lender"), upon real estate described as follows, 
Commencing at a point which is SOUTH 79.94 feet and WEST 980.57 feet from the Northeast 
Corner of Section 19, Township 6 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence 
North 68° 25' East 417.00 feet; thence North 84° 57' East 160.00 feet; thence South 81 31' 
52" East 102.97 feet; thence along the arc of a 766.41 foot radius curve to the right 
168.13 feet, the chord of which bears North 27° 17' 05" West 167.80 feet; thence along the 
arc of a 286.93 foot radius curve to the left 137.72 feet, the chord of which bears North 
34° 45' West 136.40 feet; thence North 48° 30' West 178.86 feet; thence along the arcQof a 
1002.77 foot radius curve to the right 166.26 feet, the chord of which bears North 43 45* 
West 166.08 feet; thence North 39° 00' West 250.32 feet; thence along the arc of a 2623.32 
foot radius curve to the riant 49.55 feet, the chord of which bears North 38 27' 34" West 
49.55 feet; thence South 52° 04* 48" West 362.79 feet;thence South 0° 40' 42" West 335.65 
feet; thence South 20° 24' 30" West 98.88 feet; thence South 65u 06'.39" East 39.08 feet; 
thence South 35° 52' 55" East 41.26 feet; thence South 70u 42' 19" East 53.96 feet; thence 
South 55° 05' 10" East 54.25 feet; thence South 25° 3V 15" West 179.58 feet; thence South 24u 
17' 45" East 58.84 feet; thence South 64° 06' 15" East 48.30 feet;.,thence North 50u 17! 13" 
East 158.78 feet to the point of beginning. 
Containing 10.788 acres. 
LESS 0.410 acre of OSMOND BROTHERS (Parcel A)
 :, A Utah Partnership.; 
Commencing at a point which is North 425.65 feet and West 895.81 feet from the Northeast 
Corner of Section 19, Township 6 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence 
North 24° 59' 48" West 158.00 feet; thence South 65u 00' 12" West 113.00 feet; thence South 
24° 59' 48" East 158.00 feet; thence North 65 00' 12" East 113.00 feet the point of beginning 
Containing 0.410 acres. 
and as an inducement to Lender to extend said financing accommodations; the undersigned 
Guarantors do hereby jointly and severally guarantee to Lender (1) prompt payment, when 
due of any sums of money owing by Borrower to Lender by reason of a certain Trust Deed 
Note dated December 24, 1979, and executed by Borrower in favor of BETTILYON MORTGAGE LOAN 
CO., in the principal sum of ONE MILLION TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS AND NO/100-
($1,200,000.00); (2) the full and timely performance of the terms and provisions of any 
instrument securing the payment of said Trust Deed Note; and (3) prompt payment, when 
due, of any and all sums of money at any time owing by Borrower to Lender by reason of, in 
connection with, or arising out of the aforedescribed financing transaction. 
The obligation of the undersigned Guarantors hereunder is joint and several and shall survive 
the death of any or all of the undersigned Guarantors, and shall be binding upon the heirs, 
administrators, executors and estate of any deceased Guarantor hereunder and upon any surv-
iving Guarantor hereunder the same as if such death had not occured. 
Lender shall not be required, before enforcing the obligation of the-undersigned Guarantors 
hereunder, to exhavst its remedies against Borrower or any other person liable for the 
indebtedness of Borrower, and the undersigned Guarantors shall not be entitled to any right 
of subrogation whatsoever•unti1 the indebtedness and obligations of Borrower to Lender have 
been paid and performed in full. 
The undersigned Guarantors hereby waive notice of the advancement of funds to Borrower by 
Lender and further waive notice of default, notice of extension for payment or performance of 
Borrower's indebtedness or obligations, presentment, demand for payment, protest and notice 
of protest. 
No waiver of Lender's rights hereunder on any particular occasion shall.be deemed to be a 
waiver of Lender's rights hereunder on any other occasion. 
This Guaranty shall inure to the benefit of Lender and its successors and assigns.. 
(over) 
For purpose of this Guaranty, all sums owing to Lerder by Borrower shall be deemed to ha/e 
become due if (1) Borrower defaults in the payment of said Trust Deed Note or in the perfor-
mance of the terms and provisions of any instrument securing the payment of said Trust Deed 
Note, (2) a petition under any chapter of the Bankruptcy Act, as amended, or for the appoint-
ment of a receiver of any part of the property of Borrower be filed against Borrower and 
not be dismissed within thirty (30) days thereafter, (3) a petition under any chapter of 
the Bankruptcy Act, as amended, be filed by Borrower; or (4) Borrower makes a general assign-
ment for the benefit of its creditor. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Guaranty is executed by the undersigned Guarantors this 2\th day 
of December, 1979. ) 
OSMONDJ3R0THER$ INVESTMENT TRUSTla PARTNERSHi0 
^ d^> -//a^c^s? Cs 
JH.IVE DAVIS OSMOND, Trustee 
OLIVE DAVIS OSMOND, Individual 
5UZANNA P. OSMOND, Individual 
' O S M O N D , I n d i v i d u a l mm Cy 
mfHLYN 17 
'DONALD C. OSMONDS 
JAY^W. (jfSllOND 
Mr, rYA 
VJ. OSMOND, Individual 
- JSMOND, Individual 
DEBRA A. OSMOND 
'Wfk??* ^O 
Individual 
)LIVE MARIE OSMOND, Indivi 
DAVID R. STEWART, Individual 
OLIV duaV 
A. STEWART, Individual 
) 
WAYNE E. PEARCE, 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
Individual 
) 
<* /tZrl^t {-S-CtZt*-^ 
CAROL PEAPCE, Individual 
) 
ss. 
On the 24thday of December , 1979, personally appeared before me GEORGE V. OSMOND, 
Trustee and OLIVE DAVIS OSMOND, Trustee, who being by me duly sworn, says that they 
are Trustee's of OSMOND BROTHERS INVESTMENT TRUST a Partnership, and they executed 
the above and foregoing instrument and that said instrument was signed in behalf 
of said OSMOND BROTHERS INVESTMENT TRUST a Partnership, by authority of its by-laws 
(or by authority of a resolution of OSMOND BROTHERS INVESTMENT TRUST a Partnership) . 
and said GEORGE V. OSMOND and OLIVE DAVIS OSMOND acknowledged to me that they 
executed the same. 
My commission expires: 
1/8/80 Notary^Public res id ing a t . aryA ublic res id ing 
Hoyt S. tyimer, Boun t i f u l , Utah 
STATE OF UTAH 
ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
On the 24thday of December , A.D. 1979, personally appeared before me GEORGE V. 
OSMOND and OLIVE DAVIS OSMOND,his wife, ALLAN R. OSMOND and SUZANNA P. OSMOND, his wife, 
MERRILL D. OSMOND and MARY C. OSMOND, his wife, M. WAYNE OSMOND and KATHLYN L. 
OSMOND, his wife, DONALD C. OSMOND and DEBRA A. OSMOND, his wife, JAY W. OSMOND, 
a single man, OLIVE MARIE OSMOND, a single woman, DAVID R. STEWART and DURINQA A. 
STEWART, his wife, WAYNE E. PEARCE and CAROL PEARCE, his wife, the signers" 
of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that thay executed the same. 
My commission expires. 
1/8/80 
hL77. n 
Notary Public residi ing at. 
Hoyt S. Wimer, Bountiful, Utah 
APPENDIX G 
ADDENDUM TO GUARANTY 
2088-71.PL2 
,M^ 
ADCrNDUM TO GUARANTY 
This Addendum is attached to and foins a part of that 
certain Guaranty executed on the 24th day of December, 1979 by 
Osmond Brothers Investment Trust, a Partnership by George V. 
Osmond, Trustee, Olive Davis Osmond, Trustee, George V. Osmund, 
Olive Davis Osmond, Allan R. Osmond, M e m LI D. Ooiiond, M. Wayne 
Osmoud, Donald C. Osmond, Jay W. Osmond, David R. Stewart, Wayne 
E. Pearce, Sjzanna P. Osmond, Mary C. Osmond, Kath'.yn L. Osmond, 
Debra A. Osmond, Olive Marie Osmond, Durinria A. Stewart and Carol 
Poarce as Individuals, (hereinafter termed the "Guarantors''^) in 
favor of Bettilyon Mortgage Loan Co, therein termed the "Lender", 
and subsequently assigned to TT2shington National Insurance 
Company, an Illinois corporation (hereinafter termed "Washington 
National") a true and correct copy of said Guaranty is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A" and by this reference incorporated herein 
and made a part hereof. 
WHEREAS, Sherwood Associates, a Utah limited partnership 
(hereinafter termed "Sherwood"), has heretofore borrowed from 
Bettilyon Mortgage Loan Co. the principal sum of One Million Two 
Hundred Thousand Dollars ($1,200,000.00) together with interest 
thereon at the rate of eleven and one-half percent (11%%) per 
annum on the unpaid balance (hereinafter collectively termed the 
"Indebtedness") as evidenced by a certain Trust Deed Note 
executed by Shcrrrood in favor of Bettilyon Mortgage Loan Co., or 
its order, (hereinafter termed the "Note") the repayment of which 
is secured in part by certain real property and improvements 
located in Utah County, State of Utah (hereinafter collectively 
termed the "Subject Property") as evidenced by a certain Trust 
Deed with Assignment of Rents dated the 24th day of December, 
1979 and assigned thereafter with the Note (hereinafter with 
other documents executed by Sherwood and/or the Guarantors in 
connection with said loan are collectively termed the "Loan 
Documents") to Washington National, and, 
17HER1IAS, the repayment of the Indebtedness and the 
performance of Sherwood was guaranteed in all respects by the 
Guarantors named in the Guaranty (Exhibit "A" hereto), and, 
WHEREAS, Washington National is the holder of the Promissory 
Note and the Loan Documents and has heretofore declared the loan 
and the remaining Indebtedness evidenced by said Promissory Note 
and the Loan Documents to be in default, and, further, that 
Washington National has or claims the right to call the remaining 
Indebtedness due and payable in the event of a sale of the 
Subject Property described in said Trust Deed, and, 
WHEREAS, arrangements have been negotiated and entered into 
between Sherwood, the Guarantors and Darrell D. Tanner 
(hereinafter "Tanner") of 3209 Brockside Lane, Provo, Utah 84604 
with respect to the sale or exchange of an interest in the 
Subject Property to which Washington National is willing to 
consent provided that Tanner becomes an additional Guarantor of 
the Indebtedness and provided further that the Guarantors and 
SherwGod are in no way released, discharged or excused from 
performance under any of the Loan Documents including their 
respective obligations in connection with the payment of the 
Indebtedness. 
NOV,1, THEREFORE, in consideration of these premises and other 
good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of 
which is hereby acknowledged, Tanner agrees as follows: 
1. Tanner hereby jointly and severally guarantees to 
Washington National, its successors or assigns, and agrees to pay 
any and all sums owing to Washington National by Sherwood as 
evidenced by said Note, said Trust Deed and all of the Loan 
Documents and other documents evidencing the Indebtedness or 
executed in connection therewith: by SV.erwooa nn6Jor tYie. 
Guarantors. 
2. Tanner adopts and agrees to be bound by the terms of the 
Guaranty (Exhibit "A" hereto) as though Tanner was a signatory 
thereto on the 24th day of December, 19 79. 
3. Tanner acknowledges and agrees that none of the 
Guarantors or Sherwood shall be released, discharged nor their 
obligations under said Guaranty or the Loan Documents affected, 
modified or changed by reason of Tanner's execution hereof. 
A. Tanner has reviewed such documents, statements and 
conducted such inspection of the real property and improvements 
described in the Deed of Trust with Assignment of Rents as he has 
deemed necessary and advisable and has consulted with independent 
counsel and understands the effects,, liabilities and obligations 
resulting from his execution hereof and becoming obligated to 
VJashington National under and pursuant to the Guaranty (Exhibit 
"A" hereto). 
5. That all other terms, provisions, conditions, priorities 
and limitations contained in said Guaranty (Exhibit "A" hereto) 
and the Loan Documents shall remain in full force and effect. 
6. This Agreement shall be interpreted under and by virtue 
of the laws of the State of Utah. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Addendum to Guaranty is executed by 
the undersigned this /Qflg day of January, 1983. 
c f e ^ 
DARRELL D. TANNER 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: S s 
COUNTY OF JrJ:f Uxhty 
On this j£ji2) day of January, 1983, personally appeared 
before me DARRELL D. TANNER, the signer of the foregoing 
instrument who bein^ first duly sworn, stated he executed the 
same. 
J A n rli. 11 fa A f'0 Utst 
KOTARY PUBLIC // 
Residing a t dr^O. . titd^ 
My Commission E x p i r e s : 
CC.VMiSS.ON EXPIRES. 1M-S5 
2 
?r " A " 
G U A R A N T Y 
•iOU/-.0 
IN L,::.Sj-:.'..-,;ri«-.\' of the -Mortgage f inanc ing accc::werdaticns extended to SKEr.WCCQ ASSOCIAfFS, 
A Ut-jh Lhnited Par tne rsh ip , (hereina f t e r re fe r red to a "So r rower " ) , by SLTTILYu.N i.CvJGAGE 
L0A.\' CO., (here inaf te r r e f e r r e d to as "Lender " ) , upon real es ta te descr ibed as fo l lows, 
C o e r c i n g at a point which i s SOUTH 79.94 feet and WEST 930.57 fee t f r o * the Northeast 
Corner o f Section 19, Township 5 South, Pange 3 East, Sa l t Lake Base and Xor id ian ; thence 
•,'crth 58° 25' East 417.00 fc.?t ; thence .Mcrlh 34° 57' East 100.00 f e e t ; thence South 31 31 ' 
52" East 10?.97 f ee t ; thence along the arc of a 765.41 foot radius curve to the r i gh t 
16S.13 f ae t , the chord of which bc-t-rs North 27° 17" OS" West Ih/.ilO f e e t ; thence along the 
. >arr of
 a 2SS.-93 foot rad ius curve to the l e f t 137.72 f e e t , the chord of whieh hears Worth 
34° 45' West 136.40 f e e t ; thence Worth -3 30' West 1/3.25 f e e t ; thence along the arc of a 
'1C02./7 fcot radios curve to the r i g h t 166.26 f r e t , the d erd of which Lo^rs Worth 43 ;S* 
West 155.03 feet] thence Worth 39° 00' West 250.32 f ee t ; thence along ihz'irr'o? a ~523 32 
fcot radius curve to the r i e h t 49.55 f e e t , the chord of which L:ars Worth 23J 27' 34" West 
49.55 f e e t ; thence Scuth 52° 04' 43" West 362.79 feet ; thence So'jth 0 40' 42" '.-.est 335„55 
f e e t ; thence Scyth 20° 24' 30" West 98. S3 f e e t ; thence South 65 06' 59" East 39.33 fee t ; 
thence S-ufh 35° 52' 55" East 41.25 f e e t ; thence Scuth 70° 42' 19" East 53.96 fee t ; thnnce 
Scuth 55° 05' 10" Fast 54.25 f e e t ; thence South 25 31* 15" West 179.53 f e e t ; th^-re South 
17' 45" East 53.34 f e e t ; thence Scuth 64° OS' 15" East 43.30 f e e t ; thence Wurth 5uu 17' 13" 
East 153.73 feet to the p o i n t o f beg inn ing. • . 
Centainina 10.733 acres. 
LESS 0.410 ^ccf} o f OSMOND BROTHERS (Parcel A) , A Utah Par tne rsh ip . 
Cc;:;-e:iCing at a po in t which i s nor th 425.55 fee t nad West 395.31 fee t fro.is the Northeast 
Corner o^Scc t i en 19, Township 6 South, Panne 3 Fast , Sa l t Lake Base and Meridian; thence 
north 24° 59* 43" West 158.00 f e e t ; thence South 65u 00' 12" West 113.00 f ee t ; thence South 
24 59' 43" East 158.00 f e e t ; thence Worth 65 QC 00' 12" East 113.00 fee t the point of beginn 
Containing 0.410 acres. 
and as C:n inducement to Lender to extend said f i nanc ing accomodat ions , the undersigned 
Ceir waters do hereby j o i n t l y and seve ra l l y guarantee to Lender (1) prompt payr.^nt, when 
e'.,e o f any s u s of woney cwi.ug by Borrower to l...:*d«-.-r by reason o f a ce r ta in Trust Zeed 
hVle d^ted (Vcettber 24, 1979, and oxecuL-d bv Sorrower in favor o f BtTTILYOM W0R7CAGE LOAM 
CO., i n the p r i n c i p a l su:n o f OWE MIL!ICW -W0 HUMMED TH'USAWD COLLARS AND WO/ICQ 
(*;1
 }V'".Q3oon„OG); (2) the f u l l and t i r e l y ;:crfur:r.ancc of the ter:*:s end provisions of any 
ins I n d e n t ^ricurinq the ptiyDrni of sa id Trust Deed Wote; and (3) prcvpt pevv-ont, when 
due, of ~.\vy and a l l sums o f :;••-• r.oy at any ti;.ie owing by Borrower to Lender by reason o f , in 
connection w i t h , or a r i s i n g out of the aforodescr ibed f i nanc ing t ransac t i on . 
The o b l i g a t i o n of the und^rs igr.-.-d Guarantors hereunder is j o i n t and several ciid shall surviv 
the death of ;.-\y yc a l l o f the .::•',;._ re ij.-v-d Cuarant:>rs, and sha l l be binding upon the he i rs , 
i s tea lers , '? -.'. '.u'.rrs and .-••• 
e ww-ar T'.ao C: e as if •:con 
.uar.:;"»eor norounuer a 
d --ot secured. 
and any y.:r 
.r u ; , : l l . j i i i i v d , : 
i . .WrLUdnCfS Of." rf-W- r, c d '!.; 
of subrogat ion ..!; :'.r. v .va r •.. t i l 
L «.<-••! -;^\d and ;.^rr-^r ..^i i n f u l l . 
•.^••'•'-...r: r>-oi;.g > he o b l i g a t i o n o f the u-uers ;en.^ uuaraniors 
t ."•.(•i'-v-.'.;r or any e ther person l i a b l e fzr the 
, -«J w:~r . . : ,Urs sha l l not be e n t i t l e d to any r-WJit 
l
. : : w , : s •/•nd c-b l igat ions o f borrower to loader hive 
• ••.•/* s 
t. - s t . 
;^w.nc.rs '^f^y wuive 
r . .a iwi ' : c t i - c . f •-.'• r w 
eJw ss c r c b l i e e l i e : . s s 
: a " £ i t of funds to Iccrz^r by 
•.ctiCG of ex tens ion f o r p^ywent or performance 
•.nt. . n t , dc:~-.:r.d f o r • ay ' en t , protest ind notice 
::-j w a i . - r of Lo ' d ^ r ' s r i e ' t s iiereu'wier on n.y p a r t i c u l a r occasion shal l be cee-ed to be a 
..ai ' .vr of ! ^"dur1 s r i g h t s !jci"eur,dcr en any other occasion. 
Phis Gu^r-wty sha l l inure to the b e n e f i t of Lender £;;d i t s successors zrd assigns. 
(over) 
fjr p u r p - o of 'h is Guaranty, aH z . :s cwfng to Lender by Gorr^.c-r sha l l La ..'cc-r..vj Lo 
bee-..? due i f ( i ) - . r rc- .ar t c f ^ i i s i n thG pay—nt of said Frust °eod ::cre . r in ?.!.; 
-ancc of the t._r.;s and prev is ions of r;Piy instrument securing the pa\.-.-...-nt of said T»-;s 
: :o to ; (2) a pe t i t i on uwdsr any chapter
 0 f the Bankruptcy Ac t , as a::,<_nded, or for the 
sent of a receiver of any par t of the property o f Sorrcwer be f i l e d ag.1 i n s t 3orr' jwr :r 
n^t be dismissed w i th in t h i r t y (20) days t h e r e a f t e r ; (3) a . .e t ib icr i •..•r.dar any chapter 
the bankruptcy Act , as accrued, be f i l e d by "c r rower ; or ( 0 uorrcwer i ^ e s a jjen-er:-! 
r e n t fu r the bor.efit of i t s c r e d i t o r . 
IN '-.'iniESS h'-'ESEOF, t h i s Guaranty i s executed by the undnrsiuned Gu^r tntors th is 2-Uh 
o f Cec;:::Ler, 1979. 
•i 
ObXOhOJ^OTKE^S KA 'E^ l r ^T TSiJS^a PART'-LKSHIP 
<a:&u 
! - ; 1 ( J 1 V 1 L 1 : O 1 
I'X. vlfd'AE L'S/.O'iQ;.-"/ I nd i v idua l 
y-&zd^. ./y&y___ 
'^CCA'ALD C. GSMlhOr Init; :vidL;ai 
cvw ^Q^^J7-
JAY :•;. Obi'lvJD, Individual" 
^ Y i O ' R . S Y L & U " , " " i n d i V i c l ^ l 
uOLIVE DAVIS OSNC'.VO, lYustee 
OLIVT'DAVIS '"OS>;o:-ip, "ind'i'vidua"! 
'"U/bAh^A P. OS.1""— - — - • • • • -
- • - Y c cs:::v 
VSL&AK . MOND,~ " " I n d i v i d u a l 
f..^« 
M.-^ v  C. O^ lv iD , Ind iv idue 
i y . ^ 
.v.TI-ILYN L/ GSMGND, " i n d i v i d u a l 
DEl^ /TX Oi.'-X-.NO, I nd i v i dua l 
WAY-'t'E E. PEAACE, 
STATE Of UTAH 
CCUiiTY OF U:AH 
c.o t 
I n d i v i d u a l 
) . 
OLiVV i'-VKff OS;-iO;tD, Im. i iv id- .a lN.- -
is' . ' ' * • 
Lt?.iT.:A A.~STET;AST\ !.:d-:v*;j.3i 
C;"r.OL" PEARCE, l i ^d iv idual 
) ss. 
: 1 1 x 
.-d 
'.:.:.!0, fi-.-st-::!:, --.ho being by :-.? d: i l \ 
bcf^^i e -'2 GEC^ GE V. OSJCVD, 
y ^ . c m , ?cys rn^t 
^•u•••.'•-:y o r . . .^- ' 
Ti ' i -a -e ,::id Gi.IVE C-AVIS 
:..•;? Tr;."il«;cJ,s of :".'iv:..;:!J bv ; / b'^ S i:.Vi.ST.v:^;1.f ,'-.:Jb T a P:.r tner^! ; ip, c.r:<i they e/.ccuied 
t!.;? c l . v e i-;d f.-rej^i.-.J ;:.-= t r . . - i t .:.d : '
 : t ^ : i d i r ss t r : - - r . t '.•^s signed in behalf 
o f sc-iij Oi'.v-.NO '-.-.-•!• K-:S I ,,.i.-;; ,:::.r ;.-.;ST
 a P . r t - : / - : : ' ^ ? , by :::.'lh.:ril-y of i t s by-lav/s 
(o r by euthur i ty of a r e ^ o l u t k n of Ci."-:C%;o E.XOfJ-iERS i::VEST:v;::.,T -AL'ST a Partnership) 
•-..-.d : a i d GEC^ CE V. OibVC'.'D and OLIVE ;:AVis OS.H'i.'D ackncwledned to ;.;e tha t they • 
.;•::•-.••.uted t ' e «-r:-e. 
"y . - - - i : ;s:cn ^ . v i r e s : 
..S;A,E UF 5JTAH ) ' 
• • . , . . : S S e 
C'•-•,» Y OK dFAH ) 
C:i the ^/-^vj of December , A . O . 1?7^, pe rsona l l y apoeared before rr.e GZC-.GE V. -
,;V;;.\VO ••.•! :!.i.5I '-AVIS Oiv-C::D,his w i f e , ALL.--.:.1 ^ . OS/.:::D end SUZAN.'i'A P. G£:-:C\D, his \ . i f e , 
•
;
- : . : ' - ! ! . ! . D. f;::-:::0 urid V^i C. GS.XOND, his; w i f e , :-J. WAVr.'E CS/.C.'.'O ard :'ATHLV;« L. . 
C:-;-:-) , h^s •,.-;r.-> r - ; A L O C. GS::O;;D and D ^ R A A . CE:-O:;O, h is w i f e , JAY W. cs:--.::;Df 
a ».: J . ., '/I'VE :-*A:<IE OEXOhO, a sinol e wcr.-^n, DAVID R. STEhATT and D v . - T m A"" 
1
 ^  ..V-.r, '-is .;ir«-», XAYNE E ; PLAICE and CAROL P E A K C E , his wife, the sicr-crs" 
L'f t'o -', ..*e in- '.•"•• -^nt, v.: 0 duly ac'-r.cv.*li-d;ed to r.e that they executed the scne. 
hu...;-4Tub"! ic residing at: 
Hoyl S. ';;-h ,r, Countifnl, Utah 
'r,',! J L"t ires. .JLJ...J i^iZF^. 
;L l:.; V* P u!; lie J\ \; c-: • n r. t: -" 
S. \:U:.cry ?r::r;l;f.:l, Vlch 
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S E S S I O N S & MOM IM 
A T T O R N E Y S AT LAW 
4CO FIRST FEDERAL Pi A2A E CRAIG SMAY 
OF COUNSEL 
5 0 5 EAST 2 0 0 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 8 * 1 0 2 
(SOD 3 5 9 4IOO 
November 30, 1987 
Sherwood Associates 
a Utah limited partnership 
4303 North Foothill Drive 
Provo, Utah 8460A 
Re: Washington National » Insurance Co. v. Sherwood 
Associates 
Gentlemen: 
This is to advise that we are counsel for Washington 
National Insurance Company, the assignee of a certain Trust Deed 
Note executed by Sherwood Associates, a Utah limited partnership 
in favor of Bettilyon Mortgage Loan Co* dated December 24, 1979, 
in the principal sum of $1,200,000,00. The loan evidenced by the 
Trust Deed Note was secured in part by a Trust Deed with 
Assignment of Rents dated December 24, 1979, (hereinafter the 
"Trust Deed11) which covers certain real property and improvements 
described therein and situated in Utah County, State of Utah, 
This is to further advise that the loan evidenced by the 
Trust Deed Mote is in default and the principal amount thereof is 
$1,024,797.87, together with interest thereon to November 1, 
1987, in the sum of $68,746.86, and applicable late charges in 
the sum of $9,984.00. It further appears that the property taxes 
on the real property described in the Trust Deed are delinquent 
and various mechanics and materiaimens liens have been filed 
against the property. 
This is to therefore advise that pursuant to Paragraph 27 
of the Trust Deed and Paragraph 2. of the Trust Deed Note, 
Washington National Insurance Company hereby declares all sums 
secured by the Trust Deed immediately due and payable. Unless 
the total sum of $1,103,528.73, together with interest at the per 
diem rate of $327.37 from November 1, 1987, is received in the 
office of the undersigned on or before Monday, December 7, 1987, 
at 5:00 p.m., action will be commenced to collect the total sum 
due and owing, to foreclose the Trust Deed, to appoint a Receiver 
CLARK W SESSIONS 
ROY B MOORE P C 
JOHN F CLARK 
KEVIN EGAN ANDERSON 
DEAN C ANDREASEN 
DOUGLAS J PAYNE 
JOHN K WEST 
S E S S I O N S & M O O R E 
Sherwood Associates 
November 30, 1987 
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over the subject property and to otherwise protect the interest 
of Washington National Insurance Company as by law provided 
together with costs and attorneys1 fees. 
GOVERN YOURSELVES ACCORDINGLY. 
Yours truly, 
CWS/mc 
ccs Guarantors and General Partners as per attached 
CWSI:lE-ll/30 
George V. Osmond, Guarantor 
4303 North Foothill Drive 
Provo, Utah 84 604 
Olive Davis Osmond, Guarantor 
4303 North Foothill Drive 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Allan R,. Osmond, Guarantor 
4303 North Foothill Drive 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Suzanna P. Osmond, Guarantor 
4303 North Foothill Drive 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Merrill D. Osmond, Guarantor 
4303 North Foothill Drive 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Mary C. Osmond, Guarantor 
4303 North Foothill Drive 
Provo, Utah 84604 
II. Uayne Osmond, Guarantor 
4303 North Foothill Drive 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Kathlyn L. Osmond, Guarantor 
4303 North Foothill Drive 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Donald C. Osmond, Guarantor 
4303 North Foothill Drive 
Provo, Utah 84 604 
Debra A„ Osmond, Guarantor 
4303 North Foothill Drive 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Jay W. Osmond, Guarantor 
4303 North Foothill Drive 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Olive Marie Osmond, Guarantor 
4303 North Foothill Drive 
Provo, Utah 84604 
David R. Stewart, General Partner & Guarantor 
Sherwood Associates, 
a Utah limited partnership 
4303 North Foothill Drive 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Durinda A. Stewart, Guarantor 
4303 North Foothill Drive 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Wayne E. Pearce, General Partner & Guarantor 
Sherwood Associates, 
a Utah limited partnership 
4303 North Foothill Drive 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Carol Pearce, Guarantor 
4303 North Foothill Drive 
Provo, Utah 84604 
APPENDIX I 
TENDER 
2088-7L.PL2 
RIDGE ATI ILETIC CLl IB, INC. 
4303 North Foothill Drive 
Provo, UT 84604 
224-6969 
TENDER 
1 ' Wa s h i n g t o n N a t i o n a 1 I n s i I i a i I c e C o. 
c/o Clark W. Sessions 
505 East 200 South #400 
Salt Lake City, U T 84102 
Tender ;> h e r e - - i..--.. t^ Washington National Insurance Co., hereinafter 
referred to as "WN1" if" Ore Hundred Nineteen Thousand Y < o Hundred and no'100 
Dollars (SI 1 ,^-100 00) the m v M r th- undersigned e m u l a t e t , '-•• - i * t 
c,
 r
 i *, ::, ;.;:• .v..i., : ^ ssocj.'i t es. a LI(.: i"J rUi'^ i sr)ip, secured L •. ' - ust 
Deed dated December 24, 19':9 Notwithstanding The specific sum tcru-U-'d the 
undersigned tenders the en tne delinquency due und'-r said iv-te upon presentatiun of 
sai <•1 ic\"1' : pi * 1 d~ , - n-j ;" • • ' : ^ k u ,,ie^> 
This tender is made pursuarn to U.C.A §7 8-2 7-1 et. seq. 
DATED this 7th day of December, 1987. 
RJDGF ATM! f- i ] ( ^ 1 M, 
DAR RELL TANNER, President 
APPENDIX J 
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S E S S I O N S & M O O R E 
CLARK W SESSIONS 
ROY 8 MOORE P C 
JOHN F CLARK 
KEVIN EGAN ANDERSON 
DEAN C ANOREASEN 
DOUGLAS J PAYNE 
JOHN K WEST 
A T T O R N E Y S AT LAW 
4 0 0 f ' R S T FEDERAL P i AZ« 
SOS EAST 2 0 0 SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 04 IO2 
(SOU 3 3 9 4SOQ 
E CRAIG SHAY 
o r C O U N S F L 
December 8 , i ^ o 
Darrell Tanner, President 
Ridge Athletic Club, Inc. 
4303 Horth Foothill Drive 
Provo, Utah 84604 
bear 
Re; Sherwood Associates 
Tanner: 
We received today your letter dated December 7, 1987, in 
which you tender the amount of $119,200.00 or in the alternative 
"the entire delinquency due under said note , , .!l. Pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated §78-27-3, Washington National Insurance 
Company hereby objects to your tender on the following grounds: 
1. Pursuant to the terms of the subject Trust Deed Note 
and Trust Deed and our letter to you dated November 29, 198 7, the 
entire unpaid principal balance and accrued interest together 
with all amounts secured and due under the Trust Deed were 
accelerated on November 30, 1987, and were and are now due and 
payable. 
The specific amounts due and payable are as follows: 
Unpaid principal balance as 
of November 1, 1987 
H ud accrued ml erpsl .*b 
Movember 11 10 H 7 
Unpaid accrued interest for 
Ni 'ember, 1987 
1 nt ^ Charges 
Unpaid accrued interest for 
December 1-8, 1987, at 181 
(per diem rate of $512.40) 
TOTAL DUE 
$1,024,797.87 
68,746.86 
9,820.98 
n/jju oo 
4,099.19 
$1,118*984.90 
S E S S I O N S & M O O R E 
Darrell Tanner, President 
December 8, 1987 
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3. Based upon past performance and various promises made 
in connection with the subject loan as evidenced by the Trust 
Deed Note and Trust Deed, it is highly doubtful that performance 
pursuant to the tender would be accomplished. Representations 
have been made to the undersigned concerning various avenues of 
funding, letters of credit, etc, since September and as recently 
as yesterday. All to no avail. 
On behalf of our client Washington National Insurance 
Company, the action previously described in our letter dated 
November 29, 1987, will be taken and pursued* 
Yours truly, 
SESSIONS & 
CWS/mc 
d'ark W. Sess 
cc: James W. Craig, 
Washington National Insurance Company 
CWSI:lN-12/8 
